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Introduction
Do European airlines have to provide their passengers with unlimited assist-
ance under a European Regulation if they are not liable under an international
convention? May a claimant escape into the national law of torts, in order to
go beyond the rules of the harmonised Common European Sales Law?
Something old. Little sparks kindle great fires. In private law, a single case
may ignite a series of different actions and defences. Sometimes, these rules
lead to conflicts. May they be applied simultaneously, or should one of the
regimes be excluded in favour of the other? And if the latter is the case, who
should make that choice: the claimant or the court? In Dutch private law, a
general concept of concurrence (‘samenloop’) is used to answer these questions.
Such a method is needed to coordinate between the positions of the claimant
and the defendant.
Something new. In the current multilevel legal order, some branches of
private law are governed almost exclusively by international instruments, while
other areas are heavily influenced by European Union law. As a result, the
rights and defences of claimant are rooted in different levels and sites. This
prompts the central question of this contribution: is the general concept of
concurrence still relevant to understand these developments? According to
Floris Bakels, vice president of the Dutch Supreme Court, such an exercise
will be unsuccessful:
‘If one would attempt to understand these problems under the notion of con-
currence, it would become endless.’1
In this contribution, I examine the validity of this statement.
Something borrowed. This is done by borrowing the general concept of
concurrence fromDutch private law, and applying it to two case studies. After
a comparative introduction,2 I will analyse conflicting rules in two areas of
private law which are, or will become, to a large extent governed by inter-
national norms: (1) the obligations of parties to a sales contract under the
proposed Common European Sales Law,3 and (2) the obligations of airlines and
1 Bakels 2009, section 3.1: ‘Zoumen ook deze problematiek onder het begrip samenloopwillen
vatten, dan zou het oeverloos worden.’
2 Chapter 1.
3 Chapter 2.
XII Introduction
their passengers, governed by the Montreal Convention and Regulation 261/
2004.4
Something blue. This analysis is carried out by using the following blueprint,
which has been developed within Dutch private law. Starting point is the
freedom of the claimant to choose themost advantageous action. This freedom
is only limited when the legal consequences are incompatible, or when one
regime seeks to regulate the consequences in an exclusive way. Finally, I hope
to be able to discover whether these developments are truly exceptional, or
whether they fit comfortably within the existing categories of the blueprint.
4 Chapter 3.
1 The general concept of concurrence
This chapter introduces the concept of concurrence in European private law.
It starts by presenting one prime example, which has always been at the heart
of the debate. What if a breach of contract equally constitutes a tort? A com-
parative overview shows that European legal systems opt for two very distinct,
but straightforward solutions (section 1.1). Further examination shows the need
for a coordinated approach in all legal systems (section 1.2). Dutch private
law offers such an approach, as it complements the freedom of choice by the
claimant with additional criteria – thus creating a blueprint of interpretation
(section 1.3). After having assessed existing lines of criticism in Dutch literature,
the question is posed whether such a method may be used to approach con-
flicts of rules from different constitutional levels (section 1.4). This provides
the theoretical basis of the analysis carried out in the second and third chap-
ters.
1.1 THE HEART OF THE DEBATE: CONCURRENCE BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT
Within Dutch private law, the concept of concurrence (‘samenloop’) has puzzled
academics for quite some time.1 In 1966, Boukema was the first to conduct
a comprehensive study on the subject.2 He came up with this definition in
1992:
‘There is concurrence of legal rules if two or more rules of the same legal order
could be applied on the same legal facts.’3
1 Cf. Van Goudoever 1917; Star Busmann 1925, p. 181-186; Suijling 1934, p. 14 et seq.; Meijers
1947; Bregstein 1960; Wiersma 1960, p. 229-238.
2 Boukema 1966.
3 Boukema 1992, p. 1. It has to be noted that the topic of concurrence is a minefield as to
terminology. In literature, there has been disagreement about three parts of the definition
by Boukema. First, about what actually concurs: actions, causes of action, claims, grounds
for a claim, remedies, rights or (sets of) rules. Second, about when there is concurrence,
which involves a discussion on the dynamic line between law and fact. Thirdly, about the
requirement that only rules of the same legal order may concur with each other. Writing in
English makes things complicated as well, because this language reflects the common law
terminology. A thorough discussion on these (often very subtle) differences is outside the
scope of this contribution.
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Such a concurrence becomes problematic when the rules lead to different legal
consequences. One prime example, which has always been at the heart of the
debate, is the concurrence between contract law and tort law.4 In practice,
parties could face the following situation:
Suppose a restorer agreed to renovate Rembrandt’s famous painting “De Nacht-
wacht” in time before the Rijksmuseum opens again in 2013. Unfortunately, careless-
ness of the restorer causes irreparable damage to one of the public’s most favourite
canvases.
This breach of contract by the restorer could equally constitute a violation of
the Rijksmuseum’s right to property, leading to liability in tort. In principle,
the two regimes have different aims. As Von Bar and Drobnig put it:
‘Contract law is the basis for the increase of a party’s patrimony by receipt of
money, goods or services, whereas tort law protects persons and the preservation
of their patrimony.’5
In practice, both regimes often differ in terms of establishment, scope and
prescription of liability.6 One regime could be more advantageous for the
claimant because it leads to strict liability instead of a liability based on fault.7
The scope of liability may be different as well: damages for breach of contract
aim to bring the claimant in a position as if the contract had been performed,
whereas damages for tort mean to restore the claimant in its original position
– as if no tort had been committed.8 Finally, one action may already be barred
by a prescription period, while the other action could – theoretically – still
be brought.9
The overlap between contract and tort poses problems to any private law
system, but the solutions differ.10 Some legal systems confine the claimant
to contract law, others provide him with the opportunity to invoke tort law
as well. The first route has been chosen by the French Cour de Cassation.
Whenever a fault has been committed during the performance of a contract,
the liability may only be based on contract law:
4 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 1982, p. 5.
5 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 26. See also Deakin et al. 2013, p. 16-17; Krans 1999, p. 33-36.
6 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 1982, p. 6. It has to be noted that the differences between the two regimes
have been reduced in the new Dutch Civil Code (1992), see Castermans 2012b, section 3.
7 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 1982, p. 6.
8 Cf. Cartwright 2013, p. 51; Krans 1999, p. 33-36.
9 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 1982, p. 6.
10 Cf. Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 198.
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‘Les art. 1382 et suivants sont sans application lorsqu’il s’agit d’une faute commise
dans l’exécution d’une obligation résultant d’un contrat.’11
This principle, called non-cumul des responsabilités, is applied by the Belgian
Hof van Cassatie as well. As soon as the facts of the case qualify as a breach
of contract, recourse to tort law is excluded. Only when there is a case of
negligence causing non-contractual damage, an action in tort may be brought.12
Although it seemed as if this line of reasoning was abandoned in September
2006,13 it was reaffirmed only two months later.14
German and English private law take the opposite stance: the claimant
has the freedom to choose between an action in contract and an action in tort,
when both are possible on the same facts. The claimant is not precluded to
bring an action in tort when the liability in contract has been barred or
exempted:
‘Er ist insbesondere nicht gehindert, auf die Haftung aus unerlaubter Handlung
zurückzugreifen, wenn vertragliche Ansprüche – etwa wegen eingetretener Ver-
jährung oder einer nur sie erfassenden Haftungsfreizeichnung – nicht mehr be-
stehen.’15
The House of Lords eventually followed this line of reasoning.16 Lord Goff
of Chieveley expressed the ‘ratio decidendi’17 on behalf of the Lords:
11 Cass. 11 January 1922, DP 1922.I.16. Reaffirmed in Cass. 2e civ. 26 May 1992, Bull. Civ.
1992.II.154; Cass. 1e civ. 19 March 2002, CCC 2002/106, n° 00-13971. See Brieskorn 2010,
p. 218.
12 See Van Gerven & Covemaeker 2006, p. 307. See Cass. 4 June 1973, RW 1971-1972/371
(EBES); Cass. 7 December 1973, RW 1973-1974/1597 (Stuwadoors).
13 The First Chamber of the Belgian Supreme Court acknowledged the possibility to bring
an action in tort for non-contractual damage which constituted a breach of contract at the
same time: Cass. 1e civ. 29 September 2006, RW 2006-2007/1718.
14 The Third Chamber decided that, as a matter of principle, parties are not allowed to invoke
tort law within the framework of their contractual relationship: ‘voor contractspartijen
[bestaat] de principiële onmogelijkheid (…) om zich in het raam van hun contractuele
verhouding op de regels van de buitencontractuele aansprakelijkheid te beroepen’, see Cass.
3e civ. 27 November 2006, RABG 2007, p. 1247-1257. Cf. Bocken 2007.
15 BGH 24 November 1976, BGHZ 67, p. 362 et seq, my italics. This is still the doctrine under
German law, see Zerres 2009, p. 314.
16 Earlier – in 1985 – the House of Lords had expressly rejected the application of tort law
within a contractual relationship: ‘Their Lordships do not believe that there is anything
to the advantage of the law’s development in searching for a liability in tort where the
parties are in a contractual relationship.’ See HL 3 July 1985, AC 1985/80 at 107 (Tai Hing
Cotton Mill Ltd/Liu Chong Hing Bank), statement Lord Scarman.
17 Literally, the ‘reason for the decision’. It is this the part of a judgment, agreed upon by
the majority of the judges, which constitutes precedence in English law. See Cartwright
2013, p. 21-22.
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‘[T]he plaintiff, who has available to him concurrent remedies in contract and tort,
may choose that remedy which appears to him to be the most advantageous.’18
Nieuwenhuis conveniently arranged the arguments for and against both
systems.19 A precedence of contract law over tort law (non-cumul) may be
preferable because it is straightforward, uncluttered and favourable to the
freedom of contract. It should not be accepted if parties, having concluded
a contract, tried to ‘escape’ into tort law.20 On the other hand, the principle
of free concurrence may be preferable because it acknowledges a pivotal task
of private law: to equip citizens with certain rights, be they grounded in
contract or in tort. The conclusion of a contract should not a priori lead to the
exclusion of tort law.
What solution did the Dutch Supreme Court choose? It decided that a
successful action in tort could only be brought if the tort liability existed
‘independent from a violation of contractual obligations’.21 This approach
seems to come close to the Belgian and French doctrine. However, upon
reflection it turns out that this test is different. The purpose is to establish
whether the facts of the case qualify as a tort regardless of the question whether
there is a breach of contract as well.22 If there is indeed overlap, the claimant
may choose between the two regimes:
‘When someone could, in relation to the same facts, be held liable both for collision
[a special liability in tort, RdG] and on the basis of a contract of carriage, the other
party may choose on which liability he wishes to ground a legal action.’23
So, starting point is the freedom of the claimant to choose between the different
applicable regimes, as is established practice in Germany and the United
Kingdom as well.
18 HL 25 July 1994, [1995] 2 AC 145, at 184 (Henderson/Merrett Syndicates Ltd), my italics. Earlier,
the Irish Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Canada issued similar judgments: IESC,
IR 1979/249 (Finlay/Murtagh); SCC, [1986] 31 DLR (4th) 481 (Central Trust Company/Rafuse).
Cf. Ward 2010, p. 23.
19 Nieuwenhuis 2008, p. 77-78.
20 This position has also been defended by Boukema 1966, p. 121 et seq.
21 HR 9 December 1955, NJ 1956/157 (Bogaard/Vesta). Cf. HR 6 April 1990, NJ 1991/689 (Van
Gend & Loos/Vitesse).
22 Cf. Brunner in his case note under HR 6 April 1990, NJ 1991/689 (Van Gend & Loos/Vitesse).
23 HR 6 March 1959, NJ 1959/349 (Revenir/Bertha): ‘Indien iemand op grond van zekere feiten
zowel ter zake van aanvaring als uit hoofde van een door hem gesloten sleepovereenkomst
aansprakelijk kan worden gesteld, mag de wederpartij kiezen op welk van beide aansprake-
lijkheden hij een rechtsvordering wil bouwen.’
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1.2 THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN CONTRACT AND TORT
Both solutions result in the precedence of one regime over the other. Either
tort law is excluded as a matter of principle (non-cumul), or the least ad-
vantageous regime is excluded as a result of the claimant’s choice (free con-
currence).24 Both solutions seem straightforward, but there is one complicating
factor: the dividing line between contract and tort is ‘by no means as clear
as might be imagined’.25
Modern contract lawyers question whether the division between contractual
obligations, resulting wholly from an exchange of promises, and tortious
obligations, imposed by the law, is still accurate. Conversely, tort lawyers
struggle with certain cases of tortious liability where the parties are in a
contractual relationship.26 In 1974, Gilmore proclaimed ‘the death of contract’,
stating that contract law ‘is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of “tort”’.27
He was supported by Atiyah, who argued that the idea ‘that tort liabilities
are wholly different from contractual liabilities because the latter arise from
consensual obligations is not soundly based, either in logic or in history’.28
With regard to Dutch private law, Vranken argued that ‘tort and contract have
lost their meaning as dichotomous categories of the law of obligations’.29
These findings are supported by the fact that one and the same legal issue
is characterised as belonging to contract law in one country, while it is dealt
with by tort law in another country.30
For Belgium and France, it is arguably most difficult to cope with this
interaction. The principle of non-cumul may force courts to deny a contractual
relationship in order to be able to apply tort law.31 Yet, some problems have
been solved by complementing the obligations arising from a contract with
the requirements of equity, customs and the law on the basis of Articles 1134
and 1135 of the Belgian and French civil codes.32
Conversely, the principle of free concurrence forces courts to limit the
freedom of the claimant to bring any action he wishes, in order to do justice
24 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 2008, p. 82.
25 Zimmermann 1996, p. 11. Cf. Bakels 1996, p. 44, who describes the law of obligations as
‘fluent’; and Howarth 2011, p. 848.
26 Cf. Deakin et al. 2013, p. 15.
27 Gilmore 1974, p. 87.
28 Atiyah 1979, p. 505.
29 Vranken 1995, nr. 124: ‘[o]nrechtmatige daad en contract hebben hun betekenis als dicho-
tomische grondcategorieën van het verbintenissenrecht verloren.’ Cf. Von Bar 1996, nr.
418.
30 E.g. defective products give the consumer a claim in tort in England, while French courts
allow an action in contract. See Zimmermann 1996, p. 11-12. Cf. Von Bar & Drobnig 2004,
p. 458; Hesselink 1999, p. 192 and 215; Howarth 2011, p. 848.
31 Cf. Von Bar & Drobnig, p. 40-41.
32 For Belgium, see Van Gerven & Covemaeker 2006, p. 95 et seq.; for France, see Hesselink
1994.
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to the interests of the defendant.33 In Germany, an exception is made when
‘the application of tort law would (…) frustrate the purpose of a contract law
norm’.34 As Koch wrote:
‘Diese Regel [a free choice for the claimant, RdG] soll jedoch keinen Bestand haben,
wenn, als Folge konkurrierender Ansprüche, der Zweck einer Vorschrift unterlaufen
wird, was insbesondere bei Haftungsmilderungen und Verjährungsfragen relevant
ist.’35
In the United Kingdom, the concurrence between contract and tort is
‘subject (…) to ascertaining whether the tortious duty is so inconsistent with the
applicable contract that, in accordance with ordinary principle, the parties must
be taken to have agreed that the tortious remedy is to be limited or excluded’.36
In most cases, tort law will therefore not afford greater protection, because
a claimant may benefit from its application only in the absence of a limitation
or exclusion of liability in the contract.37
In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court allows the claimant to bring an
action in tort, while allowing the defendant to invoke the special liability rules
or prescription periods in contract law.38 For example, an employer may bring
an action in tort against former directors or employees, but the establishment
and scope of liability are governed by special rules, rooted in company and
labour law.39 And a buyer may bring an action in tort, but this action is
governed by the (shorter) prescription periods under Article 7:23 BW to the
extent that it concerns the nonconformity of the delivered goods.40 According
to Castermans and Krans, the heart of the problem is thus removed: the
claimant preserves his right to choose the most advantageous action, while
33 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 2007, p. 3.
34 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 201, my italics.
35 Koch 1995, p. 227, my italics.
36 HL 25 July 1994, [1995] 2 AC 145, at 184 (Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd.), my italics.
See also Cartwright 2013, p. 51.
37 Cf. O’Donovan 2005, p. 197-198.
38 See HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007/621 (Fernhout/Essent): in cases concerning a collision of inland
navigation vessels, the claimant has the choice between bringing an action for damages
under tort law, or under collision law, but both actions are governed by the short pre-
scription period under Art. 8:1793 BW); HR 2 December 2011, NJ 2012/197: the long
prescription period under Art. 3:310 (2) BW is applicable to an action under Art. 6:175 BW,
but also when such an action is based on Art. 6:162 BW; HR 2 October 1998, NJ 1999/682
(Koninklijke Schelde/Wijkhuisen): the long prescription period under Art. 3:310 (2) BW is also
applicable when the action is based on tort law.
39 HR 2 March 2007, NJ 2007/240 (Holding Nuts-bedrijf Westland), at 3.4.4. Here, it concerned
the Articles 2:9 BW (director, not employee) and 7:661 BW (employees).
40 HR 21 April 2006, NJ 2006/272 (Inno/Sluis); HR 29 June 2007, NJ 2008/606 (Pouw/Visser).
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possible pleas by the defendant are taken into account – even when they
belong to a different regime.41
1.3 THE BLUEPRINT: CRITERIA AND CRITICISM
As we have seen, both doctrines are more nuanced than they seem at first
sight. The non-cumul principle does leave some room for the non-contractual
context, while the principle of free concurrence does not bring about the irrelev-
ance of the contractual relationship between the parties. The latter should even
be seen ‘as a move towards attenuating the difference between contract and
tort’.42 Does this mean that the solution to the overlap between contract and
tort is no longer governed by these formal categories shaped by tradition?
It is true that private law has seen a demise of the so-called formulary
system – where an actio had to be brought according to a procedural formula –
and a rise of the action as a term of substantive law, bringing the concept close
to that of an ‘obligation’.43 But even without such formulae, success in litigation
still largely depends on finding a set of technical legal rules which fit one’s
case.44 As Maitland noticed in 1909:
‘The forms of action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.’45
Some oppose such a formulaic approach. Legal qualification by the parties
would blur the overall factual picture and would not be necessary, given the
obligation of ex officio application by the courts.46 Moreover, the approach
would make it difficult to understand the ethical principles underlying differ-
ent sets of rules, and to contemplate whether liability should be imposed or
not.47 But according to others, such a formulaic approach may assist in clear-
ing up the legal controversy between the parties.48
41 Castermans & Krans 2009, p. 162.
42 Deakin et al. 2013, p. 18.
43 This development has taken place both in civil and common law. Zimmermann 1996, p. 28
and p. 912-913. In English common law, the dominion of the system of ‘writs’ (formulae)
ended in the 19th century, at a later stage than on the continent. See Uniken Venema/Zwalve
2000, p. 98, 386-388.
44 See e.g. on the formulaic approach of tort law in the common law: Cane 1997, p. 8.
45 Maitland 1909, p. 1, cited by Nieuwenhuis 2007.
46 Brunner p. 7.
63 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 190-191.
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This is not the appropriate place to describe the discourse on the aims,
structure and even the very existence of the law of obligations.49 In the present
context, we may confine our attention to two rather interesting observations.
First, the fact that the principle of free concurrence is a shared legal solution
in both the ‘civilian’ tradition and English common law.50 Although many
differences exist between the two traditions,51 this is apparently not one of
them.52 And second, that in both traditions the resulting freedom of choice
for the claimant is the beginning, but not the end of the story. As we have
seen, the rights of the claimant and defendant are not entirely depending on
whether the claimant frames his action in one branch of the law, or the
other.53
But how to determine the boundaries of the freedom of choice? In Dutch
private law, the principle of free concurrence is complemented by two additional
criteria. They are explained by the Dutch Supreme Court in the following
excerpt:
‘When there is concurrence of multiple but distinctly applicable legal grounds on
which the claimant may base his action, the basic principle is that these are applic-
able cumulatively, provided that the claimant may choose as he sees fit, whenever
the legal grounds lead to different legal consequences which cannot be awarded
at the same time. This basic principle is set aside when this is prescribed by, or
inevitably follows from, statutory law.’54
49 Although there are some modern attempts to unify contract and tort within a general theory
of obligations in English law, no such general, overarching law of obligations exists in the
(English) common law. Cf. Cartwright 2013, p. 50: ‘Books have not traditionally been written,
nor have university law courses traditionally been taught, on the “law of obligations” in
England: contract and tort have their own separate place in the law library and in the law
curriculum.’
50 The term ‘civilian tradition’ refers to the legal systems on the European continent, and is
used in contrast with (English) common law. About this division, and its misconceptions,
see Zimmermann 1996, p. ix et seq.
51 See for an overview of distinguishing features: Smits 2002, p. 73-94.
52 In the past fifteen years, the traditional distinction between common law and civil law has
been questioned in literature. See e.g. Zimmermann 2011, p. 42-50, who points at the
‘European character’ of English common law, and gives several examples. See also Fedtke
2014, who points at the increased influence of statutory rules and legislative policy in the
common law, referring to Arvind & Steele 2012 (English tort law) and Calabresi 1982
(American law). See for a discussion on this distinction: Pargendler 2012.
53 Cf. Deakin et al. 2013, p. 17-18.
54 HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007/621 (Fernhout/Essent) at 4.2: ‘Uitgangspunt bij samenloop van
meer op zichzelf toepasselijke rechtsgronden voor een door eiser gesteld vorderingsrecht
is dat deze cumulatief van toepassing zijn, met dien verstande dat, indien die rechtsgronden
tot verschillende rechtsgevolgen leiden welke niet tegelijkertijd kunnen intreden, eiser
daaruit naar eigen inzicht een keuze mag maken. Dit uitgangspunt lijdt slechts uitzondering
indien de wet dat voorschrijft of onvermijdelijk meebrengt.’ Bezemer has shown that the
Dutch Supreme Court already used this method in 1932, and has found its origins in the
works of 13th century postglossators. See Bezemer 2007.
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Taking into account criticism on parts of this formulation, a correct outline
of this blueprint seems to be the following. When multiple rules could be
applied on the same legal facts, the claimant may choose which rule(s) he
wishes to invoke (free concurrence). Only when those rules cannot be applied
cumulatively – because this would go against logic, or against the wording
or intention of the law – the basic principle may be abandoned. In such cases,
the claimant must make a choice, unless the law prescribes that one rule is
to be applied exclusively.55 That is a tall order: exclusive application is
awarded only ‘when the law so prescribes or inevitably involves’.
Ultimately, the question whether a person or company is liable, either in
contract or in tort, is not answered by such a framework, but is a matter of
interpretation. To what extent should the freedom of parties be limited by the
rule of law?56 This brings to mind critical remarks by Schoordijk:
‘Questions of concurrence do actually not exist. They are interpretative questions
with a costly label. The word “concurrence” should be scrapped from the legal
jargon.’57
Bakels has recently voiced criticism as well, stating that the doctrine does not
force courts to reach a certain solution.58 Furthermore, he argued that the
principle of free concurrence is only an expression of the existing principle of
party autonomy.59 Essentially, such criticism questions the usability of the
doctrine as a heuristic method – as a means to ensure an impartial decision
on every single case.
It is questionable whether it is possible to find such methods at all.60 What
is possible, is to improve the legitimisation of judgments about normative
conflicts.61 Better reasoning improves the transparency and verifiability, but
also the rationality and the quality of the judgment.62 Furthermore, the use
of basic principles such as free concurrence marks the order of the debate:
freedom of choice is the starting point, exclusivity the exception.63 It seems
55 This terminology differs from the terms ‘cumulation’ and ‘alternativity’, widely used in
Dutch private law literature. These terms suggest that multiple grounds are to be applied
simultaneously (‘cumulation’) and that claimants may only choose once the grounds may
not be applied simultaneously (‘alternativity’). Through this terminology, the principle of
party autonomy seems wrongly exposed. See Castermans & Krans 2009, p. 158.
56 Cf. Van Gerven & Covemaeker 2006, p. 310.
57 Schoordijk 1979, p. 58: ‘Vragen van samenloop bestaan eigenlijk niet. Het zijn interpretatieve
vragen onder een duur etiket. Eigenlijk zou het woord “samenloop” uit ons juridisch jargon
dienen te verdwijnen.’
58 Bakels 2009, section 14.
59 Bakels 2009, section 13.1.
60 Cf. Scholten 1974, p. 76 and 130; Dworkin 1986, p. 256. Both authors emphasise that,
especially in hard cases, the outcome will involve normative considerations.
61 See generally on the distinction between heuristics and legitimation: Nieuwenhuis 1976.
62 Cf. Gerards 2006, p. 5-6; Nieuwenhuis 1976, p. 494 and 501.
63 E.g. on the use of legal principles, Nieuwenhuis 2006, p. 89-90.
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that this is the purpose of the Dutch concept of concurrence: not to direct the
outcome of each single case,64 but to provide a blueprint for the approach to
conflicts of rules within the Dutch Civil Code, which substantiates the resulting
judgment. While at the primary level the frontier between different areas of
law is often not that clear, the blueprint furthers a solution for many problems
at the secondary level – that of legal consequences.65 Such a method is needed
as long as the law still contains a number of different rules at this secondary
level, leading to different results on the same facts.
1.4 CONCURRENCE IN THE MULTILEVEL LEGAL ORDER
We have seen the application of concepts of concurrence in different countries,
with a special emphasis on the Dutch doctrine. So far, this blueprint has been
used to solve conflicts within Dutch private law.66 May its criteria be used
to solve conflicts of rules belonging to different constitutional levels?67
This is a relevant question. Nowadays, various layers of public law and
European law are influencing private law.68 Coordination between those
layers has become increasingly important.69 This has encouraged various
authors to compare the different areas of law, in order to find common values,
resemblances and familiar instruments.70 The interaction between legal sys-
tems may not be a new phenomenon after all, and approved instruments of
interpretation may very well be used.71
It is evident that in these cases the solution will not just be a matter of
interpretation, but will involve constitutional principles, such as hierarchy and
supremacy.72 The influence of such principles is a reason for Bakels to argue
against the use of this method to solve ‘vertical’ conflicts:
64 Snijders and Brunner already put the usability of the doctrine for this purpose in perspect-
ive, see Snijders 1973, p. 454; Brunner 1984, p.16.
65 See for this distinction between primary and secondary level Deakin et al. 2013, p. 18.
66 Cf. Hartkamp, p. 157.
67 Parts of this section have also been used in another publication, see Castermans & De Graaff
2014.
68 Several textbooks have been published about the interaction between European law and
private law: Asser/Hartkamp 3-I* 2011, Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Keus 2007. In Belgium,
the new Algemeen Deel is dedicated to ‘Private and public law in a multilayered framework
of regulation, judicial interpretation and rule application’: Van Gerven & Lierman 2010.
69 Snijders 2012, p. 954.
70 E.g. Scheltema & Scheltema 2013; Van Gerven & Lierman 2010; Smith 2011, 755, referring
to Vranken 1995, p. 75; Bernitz et al. 2013.
71 Cf. Smith 2011, referring to Vranken 1995, p. 75.
72 Cf. Hartkamp 2011, p. 158.
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‘If one would attempt to understand these problems under the notion of con-
currence, it would become endless.’73
Furthermore, it is possible that different courts exert ultimate authority over
each of the conflicting rules, while the solution to the conflict itself will be
complicated by the fact that ‘every normative system tends to favour its own
rules over norms coming from an external normative order’.74 Sieburgh, for
example, argues that no issues of concurrence arise once a national norm is
contrary to EU law. In such a situation, EU law puts national law out of
action.75 As a result, the concept of concurrence may only play a marginal
role once different layers of law are applicable on one single case.
But let us not jump to conclusions. For one, this would ignore that also
in constitutional law, an increasing number of authors argues that the outcome
of a conflict of rules should mainly be directed by the substance of the norms
involved, and not just by arguments of hierarchy. This may be illustrated by
referring to De Búrca, who distinguishes ‘two prevalent and broadly contrast-
ing intellectual approaches (...) to the multiplication, overlap and conflict of
normative orders in the global realm’.76 On the one end, there is the strong
constitutionalist approach, advocating ‘some kind of systemic unity’ and
proposing ‘an agreed hierarchy (...) to resolve conflicts of authority between
levels and sites’.77 On the other end, there is the strong pluralist approach,
emphasizing the plurality of diverse national and international normative
systems, and favouring diversity and difference above either ‘sovereigntist
or universal-harmonisation schemes’.78
Within this debate, De Búrca proposes a soft constitutionalist approach,
which ‘does not insist on a clear hierarchy of rules but rather on commonly
negotiated and shared principles for addressing conflict’.79 Such criticism
resonates in private law literature as well:
‘A – perhaps – textbook answer is to cite the principle of supremacy and to there-
fore arrive at the hierarchically laced conclusion that one set of values simply
trumps the other within EU law’s system of conflict resolution. Such a remark is
73 Bakels 2009, section 3.1: ‘Zou men ook deze problematiek onder het begrip samenloop willen
vatten, dan zou het oeverloos worden.’
74 Lièková 2008, p. 469, on normative conflicts between EU law and international law.
75 Sieburgh 2009, p. 243 and p. 249-250. Sieburgh does point out that national private law
may still have to solve several problems of concurrence after a national norm has been put
out of action.
76 De Búrca 2010, p. 31. See generally on conflicts of rules between different legal orders:
Barents 2009, Von Bogdandy 2008, Cuyvers 2011, Walker 2008.
77 De Búrca 2010, p. 36-37.
78 Ibid., p. 32-33.
79 Ibid., p. 39.
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conceivably outmoded and in this context anachronistic, especially given that the
principle was crafted with inter-state rather than private relationships in mind.’80
Although Europe’s systems of private law share the same issues, they do not
seem to share a commonly negotiated blueprint of interpretation yet. As we
have seen, solutions to particular issues of concurrence seem to differ greatly
in theory, and are restricted to problems within national private law. Few
countries seem to be acquainted with a general concept of concurrence which
goes beyond the basic principles of free concurrence and non-cumul, and which
has been fully developed in academic discourse and legal practice.81
That is not to say that there is no need for such a method, crafted with
private relationships in mind. Interestingly, convergence on this issue seems
possible. Some of the basic principles discussed above are already recognisable
in European private law.82 In the Draft Common Frame of Reference for example,
free concurrence is the basic principle – with regard to the relationship of the
law on non-contractual liability to other areas of private law,83 or with regard
to the different remedies for breach of contract.84 The principle is set aside
only when the remedies are incompatible, and a demand for subsidiarity is
granted only when one regime seeks to regulate the legal consequences in an
exclusive way.85
From a constitutional and private law perspective, it seems as if an attempt
to apply a blueprint of interpretation to solve new issues of concurrence is
therefore not ill-fated from the outset. But will its application be helpful in
practice? In order to answer that question, two case studies are presented. First,
attention is paid to the Common European Sales Law, a proposed optional
code governing the rights and obligations of the parties under a sales contract.
How will this sales law interact with national private law, and may the blue-
print be used?86 Then, another area of private law is studied: the rights and
obligations of airlines and their passengers under a carriage contract. The
80 Low & Muir 2013, p. 1161. Cf. Van Gerven & Lierman 2010, p. 170.
81 This was already noted with remorse by Brunner 1984, p. 3.
82 Cf. Hartkamp 2011, p. 157, who refers for example to the concurrence between free move-
ment rights and competition law – ECJ 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ECR 1995, p. I-4921
(UEFA/Bosman) – or between different applicable directives – ECJ 22 April 1999, C-423/97,
ECR 1999, p. I-2195 (Travel Vac SL/Sanchis).
83 E.g. Art. VI.-1:103 DCFR.
84 Art. III.-3:102 DCFR. Another example is Art. II.-1:107 (2) DCFR, which stipulates that mixed
contracts are governed by all applicable rules, unless this is contrary to the nature and
purpose of the contract. See for exceptions to this rule Art. II.-1:107 (3) DCFR.
85 See e.g. C. von Bar & E. Clive (Eds.), Principles, Definitions andModel Rules of European Private
Law. Vol. 4, Munich: Sellier 2009, p. 3117. However, Art. I.-1:102 (5) DCFR does mention
the lex specialis principle: ‘Where there is a general rule and a special rule applying to a
particular situation within the scope of the general rule, the special rule prevails in any
case of conflict.’
86 Chapter 2.
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concurrence between different applicable regulatory frameworks, both Euro-
pean and international, and especially the solutions by the European Court
of Justice (ECJ), have caused controversy over recent years. Did the ECJ follow
the blueprint?87
87 Chapter 3.

2 Coordination between European and national
private law
New challenges lie ahead. According to the European Commission, private
parties should be able to choose a Common European Sales Law (CESL) to
govern their legal relationship. This makes the interaction between contract
and tort law relevant once more. This chapter outlines the background, object-
ives and scope of the CESL (section 2.1), after which it discusses issues of
concurrence with regard to prescription and scope of liability (section 2.2).
Finally, it explores whether the blueprint could and should be applied to guide
and solve the concurrence between these different areas of law – some Euro-
pean, some national (section 2.3).1
2.1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE CESL
During the past three decades, the EU legislator has regulated different areas
of private law.2 It has the competence to do so in the interest of the establish-
ment and functioning of the internal market.3 Initially, this objective was
pursued by enforcing the protection of consumers, for example through direct-
ives on unfair terms, misleading advertising and consumer sales.4 These
1 Parts of this chapter have also been used in another publication, see Castermans & De Graaff
2013.
2 For an overview, see Hondius 2011.
3 Art. 114 (1) TFEU gives the EU the competence to ‘adopt the measures for the approximation
of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’.
Although there is no general power to regulate the internal market under Art. 114 (1) TFEU
– see ECJ 5 October 2000, C-376/98, ECR 2000, p. I-8419 (Germany/European Parliament and
Council) – this competence is relatively easily established, provided that there is some
contribution to the internal market (see Wyatt 2009, p. 136). According to Craig & De Búrca,
the ECJ ‘is now more willing to find that regulatory competence exists’, see Craig & De
Búrca 2011, p. 92.
4 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 Apr. 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993]
OJ L 95, p. 29; Council Directive 84/450/EEC of 10 Sep. 1984 relating to the approximation
of the laws, regulation and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning
misleading advertising [1984] OJ L 250, p. 17; Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods
and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L 171, p. 12.
interventions should lead to more ‘confident consumers’, who were dis-
couraged to shop abroad by the differences between national laws.5
Because these directives all concerned minimum harmonisation, allowing
Member States to maintain a higher standard of consumer protection, its
impact ‘has not been the creation of a single, consistent and coherent body
of consumer law common to all the EU Member States’.6 In many cases, these
differences are even maintained and enforced by EU private international law,
which entitles consumers to rely upon the law of their home state, even when
they have contracted under foreign law.7 As a consequence, businesses were
still confronted with differences between national laws. Therefore, the EU
decided to strive for maximum harmonisation in its directives on unfair com-
mercial practices and consumer rights.8 Late 2011, the European Commission
also launched a Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law
(CESL), which will be studied in this chapter.9
What is the aim of the instrument? According to the European Commission,
parties should be able to choose for ‘a single uniform set of contract laws’ to
govern ‘the full life cycle of a contract’.10 This is expressed in the standard
information notice, to be provided by the seller to the buyer before concluding
the contract:
‘The contract you are about to conclude will be governed by the Common European
Sales Law, which is an alternative system of national contract law available to
consumers in cross border situations. These common rules are identical throughout
the European Union, and have been designed to provide consumers with a high
level of protection.’11
The purpose is to create a self-standing regime of sales law. However, Recital
28 of the Regulation stresses that the CESL should not govern matters ‘outside
the remits of contract law’ and stipulates that ‘[t]his Regulation should be
5 Critical about the ‘confident consumer’ argument: Wilhelmsson 2004.
6 Twigg-Flesner 2011, p. 241. Cf. Collins 2013, p. 912.
7 Cf. Art. 6 of the Regulation (EC) 593/2008 of the European Parliament and the Council
of 17 Jun. 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I Regulation) [2008]
OJ L 177, p. 6.
8 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market [2005]
OJ L 149, p. 22; Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
25 Oct. 2011 on consumer rights [2011] OJ L 304, p. 64. Cf. Collins 2013, p. 912.
9 In February 2014, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution. However,
further progress should not be expected before the second half of 2015 (see Mayer &
Lindemann 2014, p. 6). In this chapter, the text of the Commission proposal is therefore
being used. By now, this proposal has been debated in two committees (JURI and IMCO)
of the European Parliament. Where appropriate, reference is made to suggested amend-
ments.
10 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Common European Sales Law, Brussels 11.10.2011, COM (2011) 635, p. 16,
section 6.
11 Annex II (Standard Information Notice), COM (2011), 635, p. 114.
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without prejudice to the Union or national law in relation to any such
matters’.12 Recital 27 lists some examples:
‘These issues include legal personality, the invalidity of a contract arising from
lack of capacity, illegality or immorality, the determination of the language of the
contract, matters of non-discrimination, representation, plurality of debtors and
creditors, change of parties including assignment, set-off and merger, property law
including the transfer of ownership, intellectual property law and the law of
torts.’13
Meanwhile, the drafters of the European Commission clearly intended to
include consequential losses within the scope of the CESL as well.14 An
aggrieved party may be entitled to a sum of money ‘as compensation for loss,
injury or damage’,15 including ‘economic loss and non-economic loss in the
form of pain and suffering’16 and ‘future loss which the debtor could expect
to occur’.17 This is a core area in which contractual and tortious liability over-
lap.18 ‘Classic’ problems of concurrence are to be expected, as the next section
will illustrate.
2.2 DIFFERENCES IN PRESCRIPTION AND SCOPE OF LIABILITY
Suppose two parties have chosen the CESL to govern their contractual relation-
ship.19 When the delivered goods turn out to be defective, the buyer may
12 Some areas are also mentioned in Recital 28: ‘For example, information duties which are
imposed for the protection of health and safety or environmental reasons should remain
outside the scope of the Common European Sales Law. This Regulation should further
be without prejudice to the information requirements of Directive 2006/123/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal
market.’
13 My italics.
14 Some authors are very critical of the proposed definitions: ‘In placing loss of an economic
and non-economic nature, injury, and damage on the same level, the proposed regulation
confuses protected interests with heads of damage. (...) It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that these provisions need thorough re-drafting.’ See Eidenmüller et al. 2012, p. 340.
Interestingly, the international counterpart of the CESL – the UN Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) – excludes liability for death or personal injury
from its scope. See Art. 5 CISG.
15 Art. 2 (g) RegCESL.
16 Art. 2 (c) RegCESL.
17 Art. 159 (2) CESL.
18 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 190-191.
19 Their relationship will then be governed by 186 provisions, published as an Annex to the
proposed Regulation, see European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, Brussels 11.10.2011,
COM (2011) 635, p. 33-110.
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invoke a patchwork of remedies, grounded both in contract law and in non-
contractual law.
First of all, the CESL gives the buyer the possibility to avoid the contract
because of mistake or fraud. In order for the avoidance to be effective, the
seller has to be informed by the buyer in time: within six months in case of
mistake, and within one year in case of fraud, threats and unfair exploitation.20
These periods commence ‘after the avoiding party becomes aware of the
relevant circumstances or becomes capable of acting freely’ and they are
applicable both on a consumer sales contract (B2C) and a business sales con-
tract (B2B).21
If a buyer is confronted with a defective product (nonconformity), the CESL
gives him the right to require performance,22 to withhold his own perform-
ance,23 to terminate the contract24 and to claim damages for loss caused by
the non-performance.25 These actions are governed by a short prescription
period of two years and a long period of ten years, or, in the case of personal
injuries, thirty years.26 Article 180 CESL makes clear when these periods com-
mence:
1. The short period of prescription begins to run from the time when the creditor
has become, or could be expected to have become, aware of the facts as a result
of which the right can be exercised.
2. The long period of prescription begins to run from the time when the debtor
has to perform or, in the case of a right to damages, from the time of the act which
gives rise to the right.
Unlike the consumer, the professional buyer is obliged to examine the goods
and complain about their nonconformity.27 If he does not complain ‘within
a reasonable time’,28 and in any case two years after the delivery,29 the pro-
20 Art. 52 (2)(a-b) CESL.
21 Art. 52 (2) CESL.
22 Art. 110 CESL.
23 Art. 113 CESL.
24 Art. 114 CESL.
25 Art. 159 CESL. Note: the professional buyer may only terminate the contract ‘if the seller’s
non-performance under the contract is fundamental’, while the consumer may always
terminate the contract, unless the non-performance is ‘insignificant’. See Art. 114 CESL.
26 See Art. 179 CESL. Contrary to Dutch private law (Art. 3:311 BW), the CESL does not clearly
indicate whether remedies for non-performance are subject to prescription (see Thomas
et al. 2012, p. 321). Therefore, co-rapporteurs of the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) of the
European Parliament (EP) propose to change Article 179 CESL, see K-H. Lehne & L.
Berlinguer, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, COM (2011) 635, Brussels, 6.3.2013,
Amendment 192.
27 Under Art. 121 (1) CESL, the professional buyer is obliged to examine the goods, or have
them examined, ‘within as short a period as is reasonable not exceeding 14 days’.
28 Art. 122 (1) CESL.
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fessional buyer will lose his rights relating to the nonconformity.30 This will
also be the case ‘if notice of termination is not given within a reasonable
time’.31
Both parties and courts will be dazzled by this diversity. The law of
statutory limitations already shows ‘needless complexity’,32 and the CESL only
adds to a trend of fragmentation.33 To make things more complex, the buyer
may be able to invoke non-contractual law against the seller as well. After
all, the CESL only harmonises certain areas of contract law, notably sales law.
This leads to problems of concurrence, because the applicable prescription
periods differ from those under the CESL.
When the seller has produced the product as well, the buyer may first of
all bring an action for damages based on product liability law (Art. 6:185 BW).
This action, based on an EU Directive, is subject to a prescription period of
three years.34 Furthermore, he may invoke general tort law (Art. 6:162 BW),
or argue a case of misleading advertising (Art. 6:194 BW). These actions are
subject to a short period of five years, which commences on the day after the
aggrieved party is aware of the damage and the liable person, and a long
period of twenty years, which commences the day after the events which caused
the damage.35
To complicate things further, Dutch private law knows the possibility to
put aside a prescription period in exceptional circumstances. The following
facts gave rise to an important judgment by the Dutch Supreme Court:
Mr Van Hese was employed as a painter with Koninklijke Schelde from 16 March
1957 until 7 June 1963. During his work, he was exposed to asbestos. In the course
of 1996, it was established that Van Hese suffered from mesothelioma, a type of
cancer which is caused solely by the inhalation of asbestos. Van Hese brought
29 Art. 122 (2) CESL.
30 Art. 122 (2) CESL. See the comments by Zoll in Schulze 2012, p. 531.
31 Art. 119 (1) CESL. This obligation is only relevant to the professional buyer. The consumer
must give notice of the termination (Art. 118 CESL), but according to Art. 119 (2)(a) CESL
the period of prescription is not applicable to B2C contracts. It is not clear which period
is applicable instead. Critical about this omission: Vogenauer 2012, p. 18, who proposes
to include a period for consumers as well, to avoid a discussion about the time after which
a termination by the consumer would not be accepted anymore, because that would not
be ‘in accordance with good faith and fair dealing’, as laid down in Art. 2 CESL. See also
The Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission 2011, at 4.136.
32 The Law Commission 2001, p. 6.
33 Critical about this trend: Smeehuijzen 2008, Ch. 14. With regard to the CESL, one is sur-
prised by the fact that the European Commission proposed a short prescription period
of two years, unlike the period of three years in the DCFR (Art. III-7:201), the UNIDROIT
Principles (Art. 10.2-1) and the PECL (Art. 14:201 PECL).
34 Cf. Art. 6:191 (1) BW and Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approx-
imation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
concerning liability for defective products.
35 Cf. Art. 3:310 (1) BW and HR 31 October 2003, NJ 2006/112 (Saelman) at 3.4.
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proceedings against Koninklijke Schelde, claiming both material and non-material
damages. During the same year, Van Hese died at the age of 61.
The employer, Koninklijke Schelde, claimed that the action for damages was
barred because Van Hese was exposed to the asbestos almost forty years
earlier. After careful consideration of Dutch and foreign literature and case
law, the Supreme Court decided that, in exceptional cases, the long period
of prescription should not be applied strictly. Based on certain viewpoints,
including the nature of the losses, the availability of insurance coverage and
the behaviour of both parties, a court must assess whether a case is indeed
that exceptional.36
In 2005, the Supreme Court extended its reasoning to asbestos cases against
producers.37 The chances for an asbestos producer to defend itself by invoking
the long prescription period have thus been reduced significantly.38 This may
be a relevant development for the liability of sellers under the CESL, if they
have produced and sold products which pose serious risks to the bodily
integrity of its buyers.39 If Dutch buyers become aware of their injury after
the period of thirty years under the CESL,40 they may try to escape into Dutch
tort law, in order to circumvent a strict application of the long period of
prescription under the CESL.
Another problem of concurrence may arise as a result of the so-called DES
judgment.41 The following events led to the dispute:
36 HR 28 April 2000, NJ 2000/430 (Erven Van Hese/Koninklijke Schelde) at 3.3.3. Cf. HR 20
October 2000, NJ 2001/268 (Soolsma/Hertel); and HR 26 November 2004, NJ 2006/228 (De
Jong/Optimodal). Earlier, the Supreme Court denied the possibility to derogate from this
long period of prescription in HR 3 November 1995, NJ 1998/380 (Van B./Vereniging voor
Diaconessenarbeid), at 3.4.
37 HR 25 november 2005, NJ 2009/103 (Erven Horsting/Eternit). See Vloemans & Van den
Heuvel 2013, section 4. By now, different courts have disregarded the long period of
prescription with regard to claims against producers of asbestos. See Court of Appeal ’s-
Hertogenbosch 25 March 2008, NJ 2009/104; Court of Appeal ’s-Gravenhage 3 April 2012,
JA 2012/118.
38 See Vloemans & Van den Heuvel 2013, par. 4. It has to be noted that, since 1 December
2007, an arrangement has been adopted by the Dutch State to compensate victims of
mesothelioma, who not have a cause of action against an employer, because they did not
incur the disease in paid employment (‘TNS arrangement’). However, this compensation
does not exonerate the producers in any way. The State may still seek compensation for
the damage suffered by bringing proceedings against a producer on behalf of the victims.
See Meijer & Lindenbergh 2008, section 2.
39 Cf. Van Boom & Van Doorn 2006, p. 270.
40 This is the long period of prescription applicable on injuries, see Art. 180 (2) CESL. If the
buyers become aware after twenty years (the long period of prescription under Dutch private
law, see Art. 3:310 (1) BW), the CESL will be more favourable, offering another ten years’
time.
41 HR 9 October 1992, NJ 1994/535 (‘DES daughters’).
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In 1974, the use of diethylstilboestrol (‘DES’), which would prevent miscarriages
and premature childbirths, was prohibited because the drug could cause particular
forms of cancer to the daughters of those pregnant women at a later stage in their
lives. Several victims initiated proceedings against several producers of DES, which
had been active on the Dutch market at the time of the pregnancy of their mothers.
The Dutch Supreme Court faced the difficult question whether the claimants
could hold each of the producers jointly and severally liable for their total
amount of damages. The Dutch Civil Code provides for such a rule (Art. 6:99
BW), but its application generally requires that it is clear which events have
caused the damage, and that it is established that the defendant is responsible
for one of those causes. Because this could not be established by the ‘DES
daughters’, both the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal rejected
their claims.
However, the Supreme Court decided that no causal link between the sale
of a product and the concrete losses of the victim was necessary. To protect
the victim from having to bear his own risks because of problems of evid-
ence,42 the Supreme Court held that an individual producer could be held
liable for the total amount of damages.43 An allocation based on market shares
was explicitly rejected.44 Consequently, not the victim, but the producer has
to recover the costs from the other responsible producers. If Dutch buyers will
be exposed to these kinds of health risks, they may try to escape into Dutch
tort law, in order to circumvent a strict application of causation.
2.3 APPLYING THE BLUEPRINT
How to solve these problems of concurrence? May we use the existing blue-
print? Interestingly, Recital 27 refers to the concept:
‘Furthermore, the issue of whether concurrent contractual and non-contractual liability
claims can be pursued together falls outside the scope of the Common European Sales
Law.’45
42 HR 9 October 1992, NJ 1994/535 (‘DES daughters’), at 3.7.1.
43 To that effect the victim is obliged to state and prove the following circumstances: (I) that
the company has sold the relevant products in the relevant period and is liable for this
wrongful act, (II) that this goes for one or several other producers as well, and (III) that
the aggrieved party suffered damage related to damage caused by DES, but that it is
impossible to retrieve which products have caused that damage. See HR 9 October 1992,
NJ 1994/535 (‘DES daughters’), at 3.7.5.
44 This allocation was not accepted by the Dutch Supreme Court, as it would mean that the
victims would bear the risk to trace and sue all responsible companies, some of which may
have gone bankrupt in the meantime or may not be traceable at all. See HR 9 October 1992,
NJ 1994/535 (‘DES daughters’) at 3.7.2. and at 3.8.
45 My italics.
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Of course, this statement could be conceived as referring to a narrow version
of the doctrine, occupied not with interpretation, but with the preliminary
question whether the claimant may bring any other available action (free
concurrence), or whether he is confined to using the CESL (non-cumul). As we
have seen, such a narrow reading is of little practical use, given the substantive
interaction between contract and tort law.
Instead, I would argue that a broad version of the general concept of
concurrence, including its standards of interpretation (the blueprint), could be
helpful to coordinate between the different areas of law. Starting point will
be a free concurrence of actions. A court must then examine whether the rules,
as chosen by the claimant, may be applied cumulatively. If that would go
against logic or the wording or intention of the law, the claimant must choose.
The claimant may not ‘escape’ a certain rule if the law prescribes its exclusive
application.
With regard to the concurrence between remedies for nonconformity and
those relating to mistake and fraud, such an enquiry will lead to the following
result. First of all, the CESL confirms the freedom of the claimant to choose
between these remedies:
‘A party who is entitled to a remedy under this Chapter [Chapter 5 on ‘Defects
in consent’, RdG] in circumstances which afford that party a remedy for non-
performance may pursue either of those remedies.’46
The CESL does not prescribe that the shorter prescription period, applicable
to the avoidance of the contract, is intended to be exclusive. Therefore, it is
to be expected that a claimant may pursue a remedy relating to non-perform-
ance, also after expiry of his remedies relating to mistake and fraud.
What if the claimant tries to escape into Dutch tort law to avoid the pre-
scription periods under the CESL? This is a well-known phenomenon within
Dutch private law as well.47 In different disputes before the Supreme Court,
the question was whether Article 7:23 BW, containing shorter prescription
periods than those applicable on other actions,48 should be applied also when
46 Art. 57 CESL. See Dannemann & Vogenauer 2013, p. 418.
47 When delivered goods turn out to be defective (Art. 7:17 BW), Dutch private law also
provides for a wide collection of remedies, grounded both in contract law and non-con-
tractual law: delivery, reparation or replacement (Art. 7:22 BW), compensation for the
damage under tort law (Art. 6:162 BW) or because of the non-performance (Art. 6:74 BW),
avoidance because of fraud or mistake (Art. 3:44 and 6:228 BW) and compensation for
damage resulting from misleading and comparative advertising (Art. 6:194 BW). Apart
from that, the claimant may sue the producer or supplier of the goods (Art. 6:185 BW).
48 Following Art. 7:23 (1) BW, the right to bring an action related to a nonconformity is lost
when the professional buyer does not complain within reasonable time, or when the consumer
does not complain within two months. The complaint launches a period of prescription of
two years, based on Art. 7:23 (2) BW. However, the cause of action grounded on fraud may
be brought during a period of three years after discovery of the fraud, see Art. 3:52 (1)(c)
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the claimant brings an action in tort. After an enquiry into parliamentary
history, the Supreme Court decided that the legislator intended to determine
a uniform period of prescription for
‘every cause of action and every defence by the buyer which in fact relates to the
nonconformity of the delivered goods to the sales contract, also when the buyer
grounds his claim on tort law’.49
This judgment fits in with the general tendency as described in the first chap-
ter: the blueprint allows the application of tort law, but this should not frustrate
the purpose of a contract law norm. Therefore, a Dutch court will generally
not allow the claimant to ‘escape’ into tort law as a way of avoiding the
prescription periods under the CESL.50
Should that also be the case when the defective products, sold under a
CESL contract, cause severe damage to the bodily integrity of the buyer? If the
claimant brings an action in tort for such losses, should a Dutch court be able
to apply the Van Hese/Koninklijke Schelde and DES standards? Because con-
sequential losses are included within the scope of the CESL, and because ‘only
the [CESL] shall govern the matters addressed in its rules’,51 the boundaries
of the CESL are to be interpreted by the ECJ, guided by general principles of
EU law. As Wendehorst wrote:
‘At the end of the day, it should be the ideas of effet-utile on the one hand and of
subsidiarity and proportionality on the other that count, ie we have to ask whether
the uniformity of results which the CESL (...) seeks to achieve throughout the EU
would require the CESL (...) rules to be exclusive in a particular area or whether
parallel regimes of an entirely different nature, in particular tort and property, must
be tolerated.’52
and 3:44 (3) BW. Furthermore, actions in tort are subject to separate periods of prescription:
a short period of five years, which commences on the day after the aggrieved party is aware
of the damage and the liable person, and a long period of twenty years, which commences
the day after the events which caused the damage, see Art. 3:310 (1) BW.
49 HR 21 April 2006, NJ 2006/272 (Inno Holding/Gemeente Sluis) at 4.3, my italics. Affirmed
in HR 23 November 2007, NJ 2008/552 (Ploum/Smeets), at 4.8.2. The Dutch Supreme Court
also decided that actions based on mistake were subject to the short prescription period,
see HR 29 June 2007, RvdW 2007, 636 (Pouw/Visser) at 3.8.
50 Cf. Art. 11 RegCESL.
51 See Art. 11 RegCESL.
52 See the comments by Wendehorst in the following Commentary on the CESL: Schulze 2012,
p. 70, my italics. Cf. Howarth 2011, p. 849, according to whom the question surrounding
harmonisation in this area of law will always be ‘whether the degree of anomaly which
results from cases crossing the contract-tort divide is sufficient to justify what otherwise
would be a violation of the principle of subsidiarity.’ See generally on principles of EU
law: Tridimas 2007.
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With regard to the derogation from a prescription period (Van Hese/Koninklijke
Schelde), the ECJ may reach a similar outcome, based on existing case law.53
First of all, reference should be made to a recent judgment of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The case concerned a worker who was diag-
nosed with mesothelioma in 2004, caused by his exposure to asbestos in the
course of his work in the 1960s and 1970s. The Swiss courts dismissed the
claims for damages brought by his wife and two children, because the limita-
tion period of ten years had lapsed. According to the Court, this application
infringed the right of access to a court (Art. 6 ECHR). The ECtHR held that where
it was scientifically proven that an individual could not know that he or she
was suffering from a particular disease, this fact should be taken into account
in calculating the limitation period.54 And although the ECJ admitted that
limitation periods are a matter for national procedural law, it did note that
in some competition cases it would be impossible for any individual who
has suffered harm after the expiry of the limitation period to bring an action',
because the limitation period expires even before the infringement is brought
to an end'.55 These judgments give reason to believe that the concurrence
of the CESL and national private law will not lead to problems here.56
Contrary to the Van Hese/Koninklijke Schelde solution, the DES judgment is
not being supported at European level.57 And contrary to the law of statutory
limitations, the law of causality is not mentioned in the CESL. This is not
surprising, as the drafters did not intend to provide for answers to every
possible problem. Rather, they tried to come up with a comprehensible code
on sales law, without seeking too much conflict with other areas of private
law, notably tort law. Efforts to harmonise private law have so far concentrated
on contract and consumer law, not on tort law.58 The law of torts concerns
53 The solution is not, however, supported in Germany and the United Kingdom, see Smee-
huijzen 2008, p. 337 et seq.
54 ECtHR 11 March 2014, Application nos. 52067/10 and 41072/11 (Howald Moor and
Others/Switzerland), at 79: Prenant en compte la législation existant en Suisse pour des
situations analogues et sans vouloir préjuger d'autres solutions envisageables, la Cour estime
que, lorsqu'il est scientifiquement prouvé qu'une personne est dans l'impossibilité de savoir
qu'elle souffre d'une certaine maladie, une telle circonstance devrait être prise en compte
pour le calcul du délai de péremption ou de prescription.' In 1996, the ECtHR already
decided in Stubbings/UK that limitations to the right to initiate court proceedings (Art. 6
ECHR) may not restrict that right in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence
of the right is impaired'. See ECtHR 22 October 1996, ECHR Reports 1996-IV, p. 1487
(Stubbings v. United Kingdom) at 50.
55 ECJ 13 July 2006, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, ECR 1995, p. I-6619 (VincenzoManfredi
v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA), at 79.
56 Cf. Snijders 2009, at 4, who is critical about the fact that these judgments have not been
incorporated in the PECL and DCFR.
57 Cf. Nieuwenhuis 2010.
58 Such efforts have only been pursued at an academic level, for example in Book IV of the
Draft Common Frame of Reference. Although the Directive on Product Liability creates
an ‘extra’ level of liability, it ‘shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have
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a different economic and political reality, making it difficult to demonstrate
the necessity of EU legislation.59 Only one legislative instrument, also a Regula-
tion,60 clearly aims to replace the national law of torts with a ground for non-
contractual liability at EU level.61 But it immediately makes clear that the
interpretation of key concepts is left to the applicable system of national private
law.62
Awarding damages for consequential losses is not an exclusive matter for
the law of torts. It is a core area in which contractual and tortious liability
overlap.63 For Dutch buyers, it is to be hoped that the ECJ will be sensitive
of this overlap. Sometimes, the ECJ may reach similar solutions as under
national private law, by interpretation of the existing acquis communautaire.
But sometimes this would involve a very inventive interpretation of the CESL
rules, which are silent or at least not explicit on some matters, such as causal-
ity.
Another option for the EU legislator, and for the ECJ, is to allow the use
of national concepts of concurrence to coordinate between the different areas
of law. There is no risk of undermining the CESL, because the existing doctrines
tend to ensure that the application of tort law is not frustrating the purpose
of a contract law norm. The ECJ may therefore leave the coordination between
those areas confidently to national courts, without having to oversee all
possible issues of concurrence at the borders of sales law – which often differ
from country to country. This would only rarely this lead to a real escape into
the law of torts, when the stakes are high and the basis for exclusive applica-
according to the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability’ (Art. 13), and
therefore it does not harmonise the general law of torts. See Council Directive 85/374/EEC
of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
of the Member States concerning liability for defective products.
59 Cf. Howarth 2011, p. 848-851.
60 Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 Septem-
ber 2009 on credit rating agencies, amended by Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 and Regulation (EU) No 513/2011
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011. See Haentjens & Den
Hollander 2013. Of course, other grounds for non-contractual liability exist at EU level,
for example with regard to State liability or the infringement of competition rules. However,
these areas are solely and exclusively regulated at the European level, complementing the
national tort laws. See for a recent example, considering the question whether a cartel is
liable for the effects of ‘umbrella pricing’: Conclusion of AG Kokott in Case C-557/12, 30
January 2014 (KONE/ÖBB Infrastruktur).
61 Art. 35 (1) states: ‘Where a credit rating agency has committed, intentionally or with gross
negligence, any of the infringements listed in Annex III having an impact on a credit rating,
an investor or issuer may claim damages from that credit rating agency for damage caused
to it due to that infringement.’
62 See Art. 35 (4): ‘Terms such as “damage”, “intention”, “gross negligence”, “reasonably
relied”, “due care”, “impact”, “reasonable” and “proportionate” which are referred to in
this Article but are not defined, shall be interpreted and applied in accordance with the
applicable national law as determined by the relevant rules of private international law.’
63 Von Bar & Drobnig 2004, p. 190-191.
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tion of the CESL weak. While a general concept of concurrence has not grown
to full stature in all European legal systems, the Dutch blueprint might serve
as an inspiring framework. It provides a critical, but constructive eye to follow
the process of harmonisation, so as to make sure that existing rights, obliga-
tions and defences are not passed by.
2.4 CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the concurrence between the CESL and national private law
may give rise to many ‘classic’ problems of concurrence. Because the CESL only
governs some aspects of contract law, a claimant may ground his claim on
national private law as well. As a result, prescription periods may vary and
the scope of liability may be different. In this chapter, I have argued that such
problems of concurrence could very well be coordinated by using the existing
blueprint. There is no risk of undermining the CESL. For the bigger part, the
blueprint tends to ensure that the application of tort law is not frustrating the
purpose of a contract law norm. It would only rarely lead to a real escape into
the law of torts, when the stakes are high and the basis for exclusive applica-
tion of the CESL weak. As such, the blueprint provides for a critical, but con-
structive eye to follow the process of harmonisation of sales law, so as to make
sure that existing rights, obligations and defences are not passed by.
3 Coordination between international and
European private law
Now that the relevance of the concept of concurrence has been established
for the coordination between a future European sales law and national private
law, we turn to an entirely different topic: international air law. Issues of
concurrence between different applicable regulatory frameworks, both Euro-
pean and international, have caused controversy over recent years. This chapter
outlines the objectives and scope of the two applicable regimes: the Montreal
Convention (section 3.1) and Regulation 261/2004 (section 3.2). A first issue
of concurrence soon emerged (section 3.3). Although application of the blueprint
shows the opportunity for a coordinated approach (section 3.4), the European
Court of Justice chose to solve the problem by denying the overlap between
the two instruments (section 3.5). The Court even created a second problem
of concurrence in its famous Sturgeon judgment (section 3.6). Although a recent
Commission proposal aims to reduce the conflicts between the different instru-
ments, the approach is still formulaic, which may be criticised from a private
law perspective (section 3.7).
3.1 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
Current air law is a showcase of multilevel regulation.1 It all started with the
adoption of the Warsaw Convention in 1929. This Convention ‘applies to all
international carriage of persons, luggage or goods performed by aircraft for
reward’2 and may not be excluded or limited in the carriage contract.3 It
obliges the airline to deliver goods and passengers unharmed and in time on
their destination.4 If the airline does not manage to do so, it is liable, unless
it proves a case of extraordinary circumstances or negligence on the side of
the injured passenger.5 The Convention is intended to be a uniform code:
1 Cf. Haak 2010, p. 499. About the phenomenon of multilevel regulation: Wessel & Wouters
2008.
2 Art. 1 (1) Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929 (“Warsaw Convention”).
3 Art. 25 Warsaw Convention.
4 See Chapter III, Art. 17-19 Warsaw Convention.
5 Art. 21 Warsaw Convention.
‘In the cases covered by Article 18 and 19 any action for damages, however
founded, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this
Convention.’6
As a result, the claimant may not
‘[avoid] the defences and limits of the Convention by not founding his claims on
the contract of carriage e.g. by suing in tort’.7
What is the exact scope of this uniform application? In 1996, the House of
Lords issued an important judgment on that question. The following events
gave rise to the dispute:
1 August 1990. Flight BA149, operated by British Airways, was scheduled to fly
from London to Kuala Lumpur, via Kuwait and Chennai, India. Two hours before
landing in Kuwait, Iraqi troops took control of the airport. For months, the
passengers were kept as human shields in Kuwait City and Baghdad. Three years
later, passengers Abnett and Sidhu brought proceedings against British Airways
in Scotland and England, claiming they had suffered psychological damages.
Under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, their losses were not recoverable:
‘The carrier is liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding
of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident
which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.’
The passengers submitted that their case was not governed by the Warsaw
Convention, because the damage had not been caused by an accident on board
or during disembarking. In other words: they claimed that the facts of the case
fell outside the scope of the Convention. However, the House of Lords held
that the Convention also excludes every other possible route to compensation:
‘The intention seems to be to provide a secure regime, within which the restriction
on the carrier’s freedom of contract is to operate. Benefits are given to the passenger
in return, but only in clearly defined circumstances to which the limits of liability
set out by the Convention are to apply. To permit exceptions, whereby a passenger
could sue outwith the Convention for losses sustained in the course of international
carriage by air, would distort the whole system, even in cases for which the Con-
vention did not create any liability on the part of the carrier.’8
6 Art. 24 (1) Warsaw Convention.
7 Drion 1954, p. 71. Similar: Goedhuis 1937, p. 267.
8 Lord Hope of Craighead on behalf of all other Lord Justices (ratio decidendi) in HL 12
December 1996, [1997] AC 430, at 444 (Abnett/British Airways and Sidhu/British Airways),
my italics.
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This line of reasoning has been affirmed by the House of Lords in 2005,9 and
was followed by the US Supreme Court in 1999.10 It is supported by the
records of the negotiations (travaux préparatoires)11 and has been welcomed
by some authors.12
But there is criticism as well. The wording of the Warsaw Convention
indicates that it only intends to regulate ‘certain rules relating to international
carriage by air’.13 Its exclusive application should therefore be limited to ‘the
cases covered by Article 18 and 19’14 and should not be extended to all liability
claims for all damages suffered during international air transport.15 This
opposing view has been followed in France. The Cour de Cassation decided
that the same damage, suffered by 65 French passengers during the same
events in Kuwait, fell outside the scope of the Warsaw Convention and had
to be judged under French private law, which directed at compensation.16
Only six weeks before that judgment, the new Montreal Convention (1999)
had been signed by 52 State parties.17 It is a modernised and consolidated
update of the Warsaw Convention, including roughly the same provisions.
Article 29 of the Montreal Convention states:
‘In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only
be brought subject to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in
this Convention without prejudice to the question as to who are the persons who
have the right to bring suit and what are their respective rights.’18
9 See HL 8 December 2005, [2005] 2 CLC 1083 (Deep Vein Thrombosis/Air Travel Group Liti-
gation).
10 Supreme Court of the United States 12 January 1999, [1999] Nos. 525 U.S., 155 (El Al Israel
Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng). Opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg: ‘[W]e hold that
the Warsaw Convention precludes a passenger from maintaining an action for personal
injury damages under local law when her claim does not satisfy the conditions for liability
under the Convention.’
11 See Koning 2007, p. 306, referring to Horner & Legrez 1975, p. 213. For example, the English
delegate Sir Alfred Dennis stated in the minutes of the 1929 Warsaw conference: ‘It’s a
very important stipulation which touches upon the very substance of the Convention,
because this excludes recourse to common law’.
12 E.g. by Tompkins 2010, p. 47 and Wegter 2006.
13 Convention for the Unification ofCertain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, signed
at Warsaw on 12 October 1929.
14 Art. 24 (1) Warsaw Convention.
15 See Koning 2007, p. 308-315; McDonald 2010, p. 220-222 and Phippard 1997, p. 396: ‘if taken
at its most literal, [total exclusivity] may give rise to injustice’.
16 Cass. 15 June 1999, No. de pourvoi 97-100268, p. 156. See Koning 2007, p. 314, and Mc-
Donald 2010, p. 217.
17 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, signed
at Montreal, 28 May 1999 (‘Montreal Convention’).
18 My italics.
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This provision did not definitively settle the dispute on the scope of the
Montreal Convention either. According to some authors, the wording confirms
the broad application as has been awarded to the Warsaw Convention in
English and American jurisprudence.19 Others maintain that the Montreal
Convention should only govern those issues clearly within its material scope.20
3.2 OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF REGULATION 261/2004
The European Union was one of the first to accede to the Montreal Convention.
The Council explained its intention in the relevant Council decision:
‘It is beneficial for European Community air carriers to operate under uniform and
clear rules regarding their liability for damage and that such rules should be the
same as those applicable to carriers from third countries.’21
Until 2004, the EU and the Montreal Convention were on speaking terms. By
then, the EU had adopted a body of legislation in the area of air transport, but
outside the scope of the Convention,22 or in line with its provisions.23 How-
ever, the European Commission deemed further regulation necessary. The
rights of passengers should be strengthened, since they were in a ‘weak
negotiating position’, ‘frequently (…) unaware of the exact [contract] terms’
and ‘heavily [depending] on the efficiency and good will of the airline when
things go wrong’.24 Passengers should not only be able to rely on EU legis-
19 See Radoševic´ 2013, p. 97. She refers to Tompkins Jr. & Whalen 2000 and the Minutes of
the International Conference on Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air, held in Montreal, 10–28 May 1999 at 235.
20 See Koning 2007, p. 315.
21 Council Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001 on the conclusion by the European Commun-
ity of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by
Air (the Montreal Convention) (OJ 2001 L 194/38).
22 Council Regulation (EEC) N°. 295/91 of 4 February 1991 establishing common rules for
a denied boarding compensation system in scheduled air transport, O.J. L36, 08.02.1999;
Council Regulation (EEC) N°. 2299/89 establishing a code of conduct for computerised
reservation systems. O.J. L220, 29.07.1989; as amended by Regulation (EEC) N°. 3089/93
of 29 October 1993, O.J. L17, 25.01.1995, and by Regulation (EC) N°. 323/99 of 8 February
1999, O.J. L40, 13.02.1999; Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 13 June 1990 on package travel,
package holidays and package tours, O.J. L158, 23.06.1990.
23 While liability in case of accidents was clearly regulated by the Warsaw Convention, the
EU decided it ‘appropriate to remove all monetary limits of liability within the meaning
of Article 22 (1) of the Warsaw Convention’ (Recital 7). This seems controversial, but it
in fact brought the legislation in line with the new Montreal Convention, which abandons
the absolute limit to liability in case of accidents in Art. 21. See Council Regulation (EC)
N°. 2027/97 of 9 October 1997 on air carrier liability in the event of accidents, O.J. L285,
17.10.1997.
24 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Pro-
tection of Air Passengers in the European Union, COM(2000) 365 final, Brussels, 21.6.2000, par. 6.
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lation in the event of denied boarding, but also when they are confronted with
cancellation and delay.25
In 2004, Regulation 261/2004 (hereafter in this chapter: ‘Regulation’) was
adopted, covering those three situations.26 It applies to all passengers depart-
ing from any airport within the EU, and to all passengers flying with a ‘Com-
munity carrier’ departing from any airport outside the EU to any airport within
the EU.27 Depending on the circumstances, the Regulation gives passengers
a right to reimbursement, compensation and assistance.
Because the Montreal Convention does not include provisions on denied
boarding and cancellation, it appears that these situations do not fall within
the material scope of the Convention.28 But clearly, there is concurrence
between the Convention and the Regulation when it comes to the liability for
damage caused by delay.29 Interestingly, neither the European Commission
nor the EU legislator reflected on this overlap in great detail. The European
Commission did make a few remarkable observations in an early communica-
tion to the European Parliament and the Council:
‘While this legislation would harmonise law on contracts within the Community,
globally a patchwork of national rules would remain in force. This obliges airlines to
operate under different regimes and faces passengers with a bewildering variety of
rights and obligation [sic]. Unlike shipping, or to some extent the railways, the
aviation sector has not benefited from an international agreement on contracts,
with the exception of the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions. (…) Without prejudice
to Community measures, it is perhaps time to consider the harmonisation of
contract regimes at world level, a task that the International Civil Agent Organisa-
tion (ICAO) could undertake.’30
So, the Commission first acknowledged that the Regulation concerned a
harmonisation of the law on contracts between airlines and passengers. Second,
25 In 1998, the Commission already proposed to extend the common rules for denied boarding
to cancellation: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) amending Regulation (EEC) N°.
295/91 establishing common rules for a denied-boarding compensation system in scheduled
air transport. COM(1998) 41 final, 30.01.1998.
26 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February
2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event
of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation
(EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 046/1).
27 Art. 3 (1) Regulation.
28 Cf. Koning 2013a, par. 2, and Radoševic´ 2012, p. 107. Meijer 2012, p. 145 is of a different
opinion. He argues that cancellation and denied boarding often lead to delay as well, and
are therefore governed by the Convention as well.
29 See Art. 19 Montreal Convention: ‘The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay
in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo. (…)’
30 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Pro-
tection of Air Passengers in the European Union, COM(2000) 365 final, Brussels, 21.6.2000, par.
36, my italics.
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it recognised that the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions already provided
for such a regime. Third, it admitted that globally a patchwork of different
rules would remain in force after adoption of the Regulation.31
Bearing in mind the commitment of the Council to ‘uniform and clear rules’
and the comment ‘that such rules should be the same as those applicable to
carriers from third countries’,32 it is remarkable that the Regulation was
adopted without as much as batting an eyelid. In fact, the Montreal Convention
was only mentioned in Recital 14 of the Regulation:
‘As under the Montreal Convention, obligations on operating air carriers should
be limited or excluded in cases where an event has been caused by extraordinary
circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures
had been taken.’33
However, the introduction of the Regulation did put the EU in a difficult
position. One conflict with the Convention was already contained in the
wording of the Regulation, as the next section will illustrate.
3.3 A FIRST PROBLEM: DIFFERENT STANDARDS FOR LIABILITY
On one point, the wording of the Regulation conflicted with the Convention.
Under the Convention, the air carrier is liable for damage in the event of delay,
unless it proves that the delay is caused by extraordinary circumstances:
‘The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of
passengers, baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage
occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures
that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or
them to take such measures.’34
Article 6 of the Regulation obliges the air carrier to offer care and assistance
in the event of delay, depending on the travel distance and the time of the
31 This development is often called fragmentation, see Wessel & Wouters 2008, p. 37-39.
32 Signed on the basis of Art. 300 (2) EC. Approved on behalf of the Community by Council
Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001 on the conclusion by the European Community of
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the
Montreal Convention) (OJ 2001 L 194/38).
33 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February
2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event
of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation
(EEC) No 295/91 (OJ 2004 L 046/1), Recital 14.
34 Art. 19 of the Convention, my italics.
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delay.35 The passenger must be provided with meals and refreshments, two
phone calls, a hotel stay (if necessary) and reimbursement of the ticket price
after five hours delay.36 Non-compliance with the obligations under the
Regulation makes the air carrier strictly liable. In other words: while the
Convention allows the airlines to avoid liability for these expenses, the Regula-
tion does not.
The consequences are far-reaching. Immediately after the eruption of the
Eyjafjallajökull volcano in 2010, the European Commission declared that
passengers retained their rights to care and assistance.37 It was estimated that
around 10 million passengers were unable to travel as a result of the ash cloud,
covering Europe’s air space.38 There was a fall in traffic of 64%, leading to
a gross $ 1.7 billion lost revenue for airlines worldwide.39 The Association
of European Airlines calculated that passenger rights had an extra impact of
C= 194 million on the cost figures.40
Before the ash cloud had covered European skies, this conflict of rules
already led to legal proceedings. Immediately after implementation of the
Regulation in the United Kingdom, international airline associations IATA41
and ELFAA42 brought judicial review proceedings against the Department for
Transport. The High Court of Justice referred seven questions to the ECJ.43
One of them concerned the conflict between strict liability (Regulation) and
35 Depending on the travel distance and time of delay. The obligations are ‘triggered’ after
two hours (<1500 km), three hours (>1500 km within EU or 1500-3500 km) and in any event
after four hours. Cf. Article 6 (1)(a-c) Regulation.
36 Subject to the requirements of Art. 6 (1), passengers have a right to meals and refreshments
under Art. 9 (1)(a) and to two telephone calls, telex or fax messages, or e-mails free of charge
under Art. 9 (2); when departure is the day after, they have a right to a hotel accommoda-
tion and transport between the airport and the hotel under Art. 9 (1)(b) and (c); when the
delay is at least five hours, they have a right to reimbursement under Art. 8 (1)(a).
37 Press Release by Siim Kallas, Vice-President of the European Commission in charge of
transport, ‘Air travel: volcanic ash cloud’, 15 April 2010, MEMO/10/131 to be consulted
via www.ec.europa.eu. By now, the ECJ has ruled that, although this ash cloud was an
extraordinary circumstance, this did not release the airlines from their obligations under
the Regulation, see ECJ 31 January 2013, C-12/11, nyr (McDonagh/Ryanair).
38 Estimation by Eurocontrol, referred to in an information notice to the European Commission:
Consequences du nuage de cendres généré par l’éruption volcanique survenue en Islande sur le trafic
aérien – Etat de la situation, SEC(2010) 533, 27 April 2010, par. 2.
39 Conséquences du nuage de cendres généré par l’éruption volcanique survenue en Islande sur le trafic
aérien – Etat de la situation, SEC(2010) 533, 27 April 2010, at 12.
40 Ibid., at 1.
41 The International Air Transport Association is a trade association, currently representing
240 arlines (84% of total air traffic) worldwide. See www.iata.org (last visited on 28 February
2014).
42 The European Low Fares Airline Association is a non-profit organisation, currently repres-
enting 10 low fares airlines based in the EU (43% of scheduled intra-European traffic). See
www.elfaa.com (last visited on 28 February 2014).
43 ECJ 10 January 2006, C-344/04, ECR 2006, p. I-00403 (hereafter: IATA and ELFAA), at 39.
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fault liability (Convention).44 Because this issue is at the heart of the Regula-
tion, which is entirely binding and directly applicable,45 a solution had to
come from the highest court within the European forum.46 What if the blue-
print is being used to solve this conflict?
3.4 APPLYING THE BLUEPRINT
The first steps of the blueprint are relatively easy to take. As the Commission
had noted, both regimes concern the harmonisation of the law on contracts
in this area.47 Hence, both regimes seem to be governing the same factual
situations. This finding is supported by Article 12 (1) of the Regulation, which
makes clear that the awards under the different instruments have to be levied:
‘This Regulation shall apply without prejudice to a passenger’s rights to further
compensation. The compensation granted under this Regulation may be deducted
from such compensation.’
Following the blueprint, a claimant should be free to base his claim either on
the Convention, or on the Regulation (free concurrence). If it becomes clear that
the Convention and the Regulation apply different standards, it has to be
examined whether the claimant may choose the most advantageous regime,
or whether the law prescribes that certain rules have to be applied exclusively.
In order to answer that question, one has to determine the status of the
Montreal Convention within the EU legal order. After signature, this Conven-
tion became ‘binding upon the institutions of the Union and on its Member
44 IATA and ELFAA, at 34-48. Articles 5-7 of the Regulation were challenged on other grounds
as well: procedural irregularity, lack of legal certainty and inadequate reasoning, pro-
portionality, breach of the principle of non-discrimination, and because payment of com-
pensation in a fixed sum would be disproportionate, discriminatory and lacks adequate
reasons. See Opinion AG Geelhoed in IATA and ELFAA, at 22. These grounds are not being
discussed here.
45 Art. 288 TFEU.
46 See ECJ 6 October 1982, 283/81, ECR 1982, p. 3415 (CILFIT), at 21, ECJ 22 October 1987,
314/85, ECR 1987, p. 4199 (Foto-Frost), at 15. Derogation from statutory provisions is a
familiar concept within Dutch private law, see Castermans 2012a, p. 6, referring to HR 29
April 1983, NJ 1983/627 (Spruijt/Sperry Rand Holland); HR 1 July 1983, NJ 1984, 149 (Herzfeld/
Groen); HR 20 January 1989, NJ 1989, 322 (Wesselingh/Weisz); HR 29 juni 1990, NJ 1991, 306
(Schils/Ubachs); HR 27 October 1995, NJ 1996, 254 (Den Haan/The Box Fashion); HR 21 March
2008, NJ 2008, 297 (NSI/Uoti). However, derogation from a Regulation is not possible for
national courts, see ECJ 22 October 1987, 314/85, ECR 1987, p. 4199 (Foto-Frost), at 15. See
also ECJ 21 February 1991, C-143/88 and C-92/89, ECR 1991, p. I-415 (Zuckerfabrik Süd-
erdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest), at 54.
47 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Pro-
tection of Air Passengers in the European Union, COM(2000) 365 final, Brussels, 21.6.2000, at
36, my italics.
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States’.48 According to settled case law, the Convention thus became an in-
tegral part of the EU legal order.49 It has been frequently debated and litigated
whether such an international agreement, concluded by the EU, may be relied
upon to challenge the validity of secondary EU legislation.50 The Court has
developed two well-tried legal techniques to solve conflicts in this area.
A conflict must ‘so far as possible’ be avoided by using consistent interpreta-
tion.51 This was affirmed by the Court in a case of the European Commission
against Germany:
‘[T]he primacy of international agreements concluded by the Community over
provisions of secondary Community legislation means that such provisions must,
so far as is possible, be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with those agree-
ments.’52
Is such an interpretation possible on the basis of the Regulation? Recital 14
provides for an excellent opportunity to straighten out the differences between
the two regimes:
‘As under the Montreal Convention, obligations on operating air carriers should be
limited or excluded in cases where an event has been caused by extraordinary
circumstances which could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures
had been taken.’53
A second, even more powerful tool is to award the agreement direct effect
within the EU legal order. If this is accepted by the Court, which is not always
the case,54 it means that the international agreement has to be applied, even
in the face of inconsistent secondary EU law.55 In its first judgment on the
matter, the Court was ‘extremely succinct’.56 After referring to the binding
48 Cf. (then) Art. 300 (2) EC, currently Art. 216 (2) TFEU. The Montreal Convention was
approved on behalf of the Community by Council Decision 2001/539/EC of 5 April 2001
on the conclusion by the European Community of the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (the Montreal Convention) (OJ 2001 L 194/
38). All Member States have also signed and ratified the Montreal Convention, see Koning
2007, p. 46, footnotes 170-171.
49 ECJ 30 April 1974, 181/73, ECR 1974, p. 449 (Haegeman/Belgium), at 5; ECJ 30 September
1987, 12/86, ECR 1987, p. 3719 (Demirel), at 7.
50 See generally Eeckhout 2011, ch. 9; and Craig & De Búrca 2011, p. 344-351.
51 See Eeckhout 2011, p. 356, with references to case law.
52 ECJ 10 September 1996, C–61/94, ECR 1996, p. I-3989 (Commission/Germany), at 52, my italics.
53 My italics.
54 For example, WTO agreements have not been awarded direct effect by the Court, see Craig
& De Búrca 2011, p. 344-349 and ECJ 23 November 1999, C-149/96, ECR 1999, p. I-8395
(Portugal/Council), at 36-47.
55 See Eeckhout 2011, p. 330; Craig & De Búrca 2011, p. 344.
56 Eeckhout 2011, p. 352.
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nature of international agreements as parts of the Community (now EU) legal
order, the Court held:
‘As to those submissions, Articles 19, 22 and 29 of the Montreal Convention are
among the rules in the light of which the Court reviews the legality of acts of the Com-
munity institutions since, first, neither the nature nor the broad logic of the Conven-
tion precludes this and, second, those three articles appear, as regards their content,
to be unconditional and sufficiently precise.’57
As a result, precedence of the Montreal Convention over any action for
damages within its scope is provided both by its own conflict rule and by its
direct effect within the EU legal order. The Montreal Convention has to be
applied, even when that means that inconsistent secondary EU law is to be
excluded. Applying the blueprint on these conflicts should therefore lead to
the following result: a free concurrence of actions, available to the claimant, but
subject to the special liability rules from the Convention.
3.5 A FIRST ANSWER: NO OVERLAP BETWEEN THE INSTRUMENTS
Interestingly, the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the
UK government submitted that there was no conflict between the two instru-
ments, because the Regulation did not concern compensation for damage
within the meaning of the Convention. According to these submissions, the
systems have different aims.58
According to AG Geelhoed, there was ‘no doubt’ about the binding nature
of the Convention within the EU legal order.59 He argued that while it was
clear that the Convention is exhaustive with respect to actions for damages,60
it was also clear that the Regulation ‘does not deal with civil liability or actions
for damages’.61 An action for damages requires an assessment about the
occurrence and the amount of the damage, a causal link with the delay and
the possibility of a defence.62 According to the AG, the purpose of the Regula-
tion is different:
‘The objective of Article 6 is to protect passengers by obliging carriers to provide
care and to assist stranded passengers, regardless of whether there is damage. There
is no need to show any damage, and any fault on the part of the air carrier is irrelevant
for this purpose. Consequently, there is no need for a defence either. (…) The obliga-
57 IATA and ELFAA, at 39, my italics.
58 See Opinion AG Geelhoed in IATA and ELFAA, at 25-29.
59 Ibid., at 32.
60 Ibid., at 43-45.
61 Ibid., at 46.
62 Ibid., at 46.
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tion to provide a minimum of service during the delay, and thus the protection
afforded to passengers, constitute rules of a public nature.’63
Therefore, the AG argued that Article 6 of the Regulation was not in conflict
with the Montreal Convention. Both instruments may be enforced separately
before civil courts.64
The ECJ followed its AG and distinguished the two instruments as well.
After having confirmed the binding nature of the Convention,65 the Court
assumed that delay may, generally, cause two types of damage:
‘First, excessive delay will cause damage that is almost identical for every passenger,
redress for which may take the form of standardised and immediate assistance
or care for everybody concerned, through the provision, for example, of refresh-
ments, meals and accommodation and of the opportunity to make telephone calls.
Second, passengers are liable to suffer individual damage, inherent in the reason
for travelling, redress for which requires a case-by-case assessment of the extent
of the damage caused and can consequently only be the subject of compensation
granted subsequently on an individual basis.’66
The Court held that the Regulation was a different ‘form of intervention’,
aimed at reducing the damages at an ‘earlier stage’67 to prevent ‘the incon-
venience inherent in the bringing of actions for damages before the courts’.68
According to the Court, the instruments were separate compensatory systems:
there was no overlap, and therefore no conflict.
Consequently, the Court decided not to solve the conflict by using consistent
interpretation, based on Recital 14:
‘[T]he wording of those recitals indeed gives the impression that, generally,
operating air carriers should be released from all their obligations in the event of
extraordinary circumstances, and it accordingly gives rise to a certain ambiguity
between the intention thus expressed by the Community legislature and the actual
content of Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation No 261/2004 which do not make this
defence to liability so general in character. However, such an ambiguity does not extend
so far as to render incoherent the system set up by those two articles, which are themselves
entirely unambiguous.’69
63 Ibid., at 47-48, my italics.
64 Ibid., at 53.
65 IATA and ELFAA, at. 36-39.
66 Ibid., at 43, my italics.
67 Ibid., at 46.
68 Ibid., at 45.
69 Ibid., par. 76, referring to ECJ 12 July 2005, C-154/04 and C-155/04, ECR 2005, p. I-06451
(Alliance for Natural Health and Others), at 91; ECJ 24 November 2005, C-136/04, ECR 2005,
p. I-10095 (Deutsches Milch-Kontor), at 32; and ECJ 19 November 1998, C-162/97, ECR 1998,
p. I-7477 (Nilsson and Others), at 54, my italics.
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This approach raised criticism. According to Koning, the ECJ ‘ignored’ the
international legal order, it did not show a sense of comparative law, it decided
without substantive arguments that the Convention only deals with individual
damage and it discounted ‘forty years of legal developments’ by concluding
that the drafters of the Convention did not intend to shield carriers from
further regulation.70
Harsh words, but not without reason. The attempts of the Court to draw
a line between ‘public law’ (Regulation) and ‘private law’ (Convention) are
ill-fated. Indeed, they are different compensatory systems, but they govern
the same situations, and partly also the same damages. Both instruments are in
fact relevant for civil liability, while both impose obligations on the parties
to a carriage contract and both create possible claims and defences before civil
courts. Therefore, differences between them must be bridged through recogni-
tion, not denial, of their overlap.71
Would the ECJ have come to a different result if it had followed the blue-
print? That remains to be seen. After all, the Court could still have decided
that both instruments do not overlap and that application of the blueprint is
not needed. After all, the blueprint does not compel courts to reach a certain
result in a particular case. On the other hand, it is established practice that
the legal relationship between the parties should be governed not by formal
categories of the law (contract/tort, Regulation/Convention), but by
recognising their overlap and interaction. It is this spirit of coordination which
is missing in this judgment of the ECJ. As the next section will illustrate, the
Court maintained a strict division between the instruments, and even created
another conflict with the Convention.
3.6 A SECOND PROBLEM: STANDARDISED COMPENSATION FOR DELAY
One of the more ‘painful areas’ within the Regulation concerned the difference
in legal consequences between delay and cancellation.72 When a flight is being
70 Cf. Koning 2013a, par. 4. Mok also disagrees with both the AG and the ECJ in his case note
under IATA and ELFAA. See Mok 2006, at 4: ‘In the event of cancellation and delay, the
Regulation governs the legal relationship between private subjects, air carriers and their
passengers, and thus has to this extent a private law character (consumer law).’ In Dutch:
‘De verordening regelt, voor de gevallen van annulering en vertraging, rechtsbetrekkingen
tussen luchtvaartmaatschappijen en hun passagiers, dus tussen private rechtssubjecten en
heeft in zoverre het karakter van privaatrecht (consumentenrecht).’
71 See also Koning 2013b, p. 114.
72 Haak 2010, p. 503. According to Haak, the other painful area concerns the exact scope of
the force majeure (‘extraordinary circumstances’), which is not being discussed in this
contribution.
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cancelled, the air carrier has to pay standardised compensation, ranging from
C= 250 to C= 600 and depending on the distance of the flight.73 In the event of
delay, the air carrier is only obliged to provide care and assistance.
While drafting the Regulation, the Commission admitted that all passengers
‘suffer the same inconvenience and frustration’, whether resulting from delay,
cancellation or denied boarding.74 Yet, difference in treatment was justified,
not because of a possible conflict with the Montreal Convention, but because
the airline is not always responsible for delays, and because the solution to
passing-on claims was difficult to regulate:
‘The Commission accepts that in these circumstances it would be technically
impossible to legislate on financial compensation for delays, but will reflect on how
to overcome these difficulties.’75
As a result, passengers on delayed flights did not get the right to standardised
compensation. One could imagine their dissatisfaction. Suppose two passengers
each book a flight from Amsterdam to Paramaribo. One flight is cancelled,
after which the passenger is rebooked and arrives at Paramaribo five hours
later than planned. He gets C= 600 compensation. The flight of the other
passenger has not been cancelled, but has a delay of 24 hours. The passenger
receives care and assistance, but no compensation.76
73 Art. 7 Regulation: ‘passengers shall receive compensation amounting to:
(a) EUR 250 for all flights of 1500 kilometres or less;
(b) EUR 400 for all intra-Community flights of more than 1500 kilometres, and for all other
flights between 1500 and 3500 kilometres;
(c) EUR 600 for all flights not falling under (a) or (b)’.
Following Art. 5 (1)(c), there is no such right if:
(i) they are informed of the cancellation at least two weeks before the scheduled time of
departure; or
(ii) they are informed of the cancellation between two weeks and seven days before the
scheduled time of departure and are offered re-routing, allowing them to depart no more
than two hours before the scheduled time of departure and to reach their final destination
less than four hours after the scheduled time of arrival; or
(iii) they are informed of the cancellation less than seven days before the scheduled time
of departure and are offered re-routing, allowing them to depart no more than one hour
before the scheduled time of departure and to reach their final destination less than two
hours after the scheduled time of arrival.’
74 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Pro-
tection of Air Passengers in the European Union, COM(2000) 365 final, Brussels, 21.6.2000, at.
43.
75 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, Pro-
tection of Air Passengers in the European Union, COM(2000) 365 final, Brussels, 21.6.2000, at
45, my italics.
76 Similar examples were given by AG Sharpston in her Conclusion in Sturgeon, at 53 and
55, and by Van Dam 2010, at 2.
40 Chapter 3
This difference in treatment was reason for the German BGH and the Vienna
Commercial Court to refer the following question to the ECJ: could a delayed
flight be equated with a cancelled flight and if so, under what circumstances?77
AG Sharpston considered the distinction between cancellation and delay
to be at odds with the principle of equal treatment.78 However, in order to
grant compensation also to delayed passengers, a dividing line had to be fixed
between ‘the fortunate and the unfortunate’.79 Such an assessment was up
to the legislator, not to the Court:
‘Thus, the Community legislator can select a particular time-limit (23 and a half
hours, 24 hours, 25 hours, or 48 hours – whatever it be) triggering a right to
compensation. The Court cannot. Any figure one cared to pick would involve
reading into the Regulation something it plainly does not contain and would be
a judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative.’80
Considering that the principle of equal treatment had not been discussed before
the Court,81 and that the underlying problem is inherent to the structure of
the Regulation82 and cannot be ‘fixed by interpretation, however construct-
ive’,83 the AG advised the Court to reopen the oral procedure, to invite sub-
missions by the Member States, the Commission, the European Parliament
and the Council.84
The ECJ decided differently. First, it acknowledged that a flight with delay,
however substantial, cannot be regarded a cancelled flight if it is operated
according to the original planning.85 However, the passengers find themselves
in ‘comparable situations’,86 leading to an unjustified difference in treatment,
according to the Court.87
Instead of declaring the Regulation invalid or reopening the oral procedure,
the Court awarded passengers on delayed flights a right to compensation when
they suffer ‘a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours’.88 Justification
for this dividing line was found in the fact that re-routed passengers get com-
77 ECJ 19 November 2009, C-402/07 and C-432/07, ECR 2009, p. I-10923 (Sturgeon/Condor and
Böck/Air France, hereafter: Sturgeon).
78 Conclusion AG Sharpston in Sturgeon, at 62.
79 Ibid., at 93.
80 Ibid., at 94.
81 Ibid., at 65.
82 Ibid., at 96.
83 Ibid., at 97. According to the AG, a solution through interpretation would go against legal
certainty and demonstrate a ‘very teleological approach to consumer protection’, cf. Con-
clusion AG Sharpston, at 91.
84 Ibid., at 97.
85 Sturgeon, at 33-34.
86 Ibid., at 54.
87 Ibid., at 59.
88 Ibid., at 61, my italics.
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pensated if they suffer the same delay.89 Although the ECJ refrained from
using the preamble in the abovementioned IATA and ELFAA-judgment, it used
Recital 15 to substantiate its claim here.90 Because the legislator mentioned
delay and cancellation in the same breath for the purpose of defining ‘extra-
ordinary circumstances’,91 the Court claimed that ‘it must be held that the
legislature also linked that notion [long delay, RdG] to the right to compensa-
tion’.92
As a result, the ECJ in fact rewrote the Regulation and created overlap with
the Convention.93 Not surprisingly, this approach led to a torrent of critic-
ism,94 while only few authors have defended the outcome of the case.95 Two
lines of criticism may be recognised: (1) by interpreting contra legem the Court
crossed the boundaries of its judicial function, and (2) the judgment conflicts
with the Montreal Convention.96
With regard to the second argument, it is important to note that the Court
did not pay attention to the Montreal Convention at all. Yet, the Convention
stresses that an award for damages has to be compensatory:
‘In any such action [for damages, RdG], punitive, exemplary or any other non-
compensatory damages shall not be recoverable.’97
According to the Court, the Regulation is aimed at repairing ‘damage consisting,
for the passengers concerned, in a loss of time which, given that it is irreversible,
can be redressed only by compensation’.98 Interestingly, a 2008 impact assess-
ment study, conducted for the European Commission, estimated the economic
value of the loss of time because of delay to lie somewhere between C= 16 per
89 Under Article 5 (1)(c)(iii), these passengers get compensation if the carrier fails to re-route
them on a flight which departs no more than one hour before the scheduled time of
departure and reaches its final destination less than two hours after the scheduled time
of arrival. Balfour is critical, calling the analogy ‘in fact not quite correct (...) because [these,
RdG] passengers (...) will in fact arrive at their final destination up to two not three hours
late’. See Balfour 2012, p. 381.
90 Critical also Balfour 2012, p. 378.
91 Recital 15 of the Regulation: ‘Extraordinary circumstances should be deemed to exist where
the impact of an air traffic management decision in relation to a particular aircraft on a
particular day gives rise to a long delay, an overnight delay, or the cancellation of one or
more flights by that aircraft, even though all reasonable measures had been taken by the
air carrier concerned to avoid the delays or cancellations.’
92 Sturgeon, at 43. Although the ECJ noted that compensation in the event of delay ‘does not
expressly follow from the wording of the Regulation’, at 41.
93 Also Van Dam, a proponent of the outcome, wrote that the Court has ‘in fact added a new
rule to the Regulation’, see Van Dam 2010, at 3.
94 Balfour 2010 & 2012, Haak 2010, Mendes de Leon 2010 & 2012, Mok 2010. For an overview
of scholarly reactions see Garben 2013, at 3.1.
95 Van Dam 2010; Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010 and Garben 2013.
96 See Garben 2013, p. 26.
97 Art. 29 (1) Montreal Convention, my italics.
98 Sturgeon, at 52, my italics.
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hour (for leisure travellers) and C= 39 per hour (for business travellers) within
the EU.99 These values are significantly lower than the fixed compensation
(starting at C= 250 after three hours) the ECJ awarded each passenger for their
loss of time.
The airlines did not accept the decision by the ECJ. They refused to pay
compensation in many cases, persuading different courts to stay proceedings
and refer new questions to the Court.100 This led to the Nelson-judgment,
in which the Court was forced to look at the relationship between the two
instruments once more. Having qualified the Regulation as a means to redress
damage because of a loss of time in Sturgeon, it decided here that the loss of
time is not damage, but an ‘inconvenience’:
‘First of all, a loss of time is not damage arising as a result of a delay, but is an incon-
venience, like other inconveniences inherent in cases of denied boarding, flight
cancellation and long delay and encountered in them, such as lack of comfort or
the fact of being temporarily denied means of communication normally available.
(…) Next, a loss of time is suffered identically by all passengers whose flights are delayed
and, consequently, it is possible to redress that loss by means of a standardised
measure, without having to carry out any assessment of the individual situation
of each passenger concerned. (…) Lastly, there is not necessarily a causal link between,
on the one hand, the actual delay and, on the other, the loss of time considered
relevant for the purpose of giving rise to a right to compensation under Regulation
No 261/2004 or calculating the amount of that compensation.’101
The Court maintained and reinforced the strict, but rather artificial distinction
between the two instruments. It decided to keep track, probably also to pre-
serve its credibility102 and to avoid ‘causing something like a legal and
practical mess’.103
Would the Court have come to a different result if it had followed the
blueprint? That remains to be seen. The blueprint still leaves room to decide
that standardised compensation is implicit in the Regulation, and that this
rule is not applicable to the same damages as the Convention is. On the other
hand, the blueprint reminds us of the importance of coordination, rather than
elimination, of legal rules. Regrettably, such an approach has not been followed
in the present judgments, which leads to the denial of the defences of the
airlines under the Montreal Convention.
99 Boon et al. 2008, p. 29-30.
100 See Van Dam 2011, p. 262-263; and Koning 2013b, p. 113-114.
101 ECJ 23 October 2012, C-581/10 and C-629/10, nyr (Nelson/Lufthansa and TUI Travel/Civil
Aviation Authority), at 51-53, my italics. Questions referred by the Amtsgericht Köln and
the High Court of Justice of England and Wales.
102 Cf. Garben 2013 and Koning 2013a, concluding remarks.
103 Van Dam 2011, p. 274.
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It is this spirit of coordination which comes forward in a recent proposal
by the European Commission, which suggests several adjustments to sober
down the Regulation. This is an indication that the interpretation by the ECJ
has been unduly strict, as the next section will illustrate.
3.7 THE COMMISSION PROPOSAL: REDUCING THE CONFLICT
Last March, the European Commission launched a proposal with adjustments
to the Regulation.104 With regard to the problematic points discussed in the
previous sections, the proposal contains useful suggestions.
First of all, the Commission acknowledges that an unlimited obligation
to provide care and assistance is out of sync with reality, because it ‘exposes
the airlines to significant (and unlimited) costs and practical problems for
assistance and rerouting in the case of such large scale events’.105 Therefore,
the Commission proposes a new paragraph to be added to Article 9 of the
Regulation:
’If the operating air carrier can prove that the cancellation, delay or change of
schedule is caused by extraordinary circumstances and that the cancellation, delay
or change of schedule could not have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had
been taken, it may limit the total cost of accommodation provided according to para-
graph 1(b) to EUR 100 per night and per passenger and to a maximum of 3
nights.’106
Contrary to the Convention, an air carrier is still liable for some losses, even
when caused by extraordinary circumstances. This is to be regretted from a
systemic point of view, as it maintains two contradictory standards in the
Convention and the Regulation in place. However, it is to be welcomed that
the proposal substantially limits the tension.
104 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and
Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers
and their baggage by air, COM (2013) final.
105 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delays of flights
and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of
passengers and their baggage by air, SWD (2013) 62 final, Brussels 13.3.2013, at 3.2.
106 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and
Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of passengers
and their baggage by air, COM (2013) final, p. 21, my italics.
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What about the award of standardised compensation in the event of delay?
Again, the ECJ seemed to have been too harsh on the position of the airlines
in the eyes of the Commission:
‘[T]he amounts fixed in the Regulation can in many cases go beyond the value of
the damage (i.e. loss of time) incurred by passengers as established by economic
studies.’107
The Commission proposes to sober down the compensation scheme. It con-
sidered two alternative measures: (1) to award passengers compensation, based
on a percentage of the value of their ticket, or (2) compensation based on the
length of the delay.108 Apart from practical problems,109 these alternatives
were rejected because the consistency with the Montreal Convention ‘cannot
be taken for granted’ and an intervention by the ECJ could – apparently – be
expected. With regard to the second measure, the Commission stated:
‘Even if the court were to consider fixed-rate compensation to be in line with the
Montreal Convention as “standardised assistance” or something similar [as the
ECJ did in Sturgeon, RdG], there could be an argument that per-hour compensation
conflicts, as it is less standardised and a closer proxy to the actual damage that the
passenger has suffered.’110
This is a poor assessment by the Commission’s legal service. It suggests that
the proposal could avoid inconsistency with the Convention by not awarding
a level of compensation which is a closer proxy to the actual damage. In my
opinion, the Commission could have removed the heart of the problem con-
vincingly by tying the standardised compensation under the Regulation more
closely to the actual losses, with economic assessments providing for a firm
107 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delays of flights
and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of
passengers and their baggage by air, SWD (2013) 62 final, Brussels 13.3.2013, at 4.2.2.
108 Ibid., at 11.
109 The calculation of the flight price could be difficult when a passenger changes flights in-
between and when he has a package deal with a tour operator. With respect to the second
measure, the Commission saw practical problems in establishing the length of the delay,
since that length is also dependent on the willingness of the passenger to accept an alternat-
ive flight.
110 Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment Accompanying the document
Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to
passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delays of flights
and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of
passengers and their baggage by air, SWD (2013) 62 final, Brussels 13.3.2013, Annex 11,
my italics.
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basis.111 In my opinion, standardised compensation is not prohibited, as long
as it approximates the actual losses suffered.
Instead, the Commission chose a third alternative: to leave the current
system in place, while only the ‘dividing time line’, after which a passenger
has a right to compensation, is being raised to:
(a) five hours or more after the scheduled time of arrival for all intra-Community
journeys and for journeys to/from third countries of 3500 kilometres or less;
(b) nine hours or more after the scheduled time of arrival for journeys to/from
third countries between 3500 and 6000 kilometres;
(c) twelve hours or more after the scheduled time of arrival for journeys to/from
third countries of 6000 kilometres or more.112
It is doubtful whether this proposal will make it in the European Parliament,
since it would mean a weakening of the current protection of passengers.113
However, from a systemic point of view it is to be welcomed that the Commis-
sion proposes to bring amount of damages closer to the actual damage suf-
fered.
Nevertheless, the proposal does not end the discussion on the nature and
overlap of both instruments. Also under the new Regulation, the existing
uncertainty and confusion is not being dispelled. It would be desirable if the
EU legislator would grab the opportunity to recognise the concurrence between
the Regulation and the Convention. This could be done by including the
following statement in the preamble:
‘This Regulation harmonises certain aspects of the contractual relationship between
airlines and their passengers. Its rules are aimed to redress the minimum
standardised damage which every passenger suffers when confronted with delay,
cancellation or denied boarding, so as to prevent a passenger the inconvenience
of bringing court proceedings. Its rules are to be applied in consistency with the
Montreal Convention. The issues that are not regulated under this Regulation will
111 A 2008 impact assessment study, conducted for the European Commission, estimated the
economic value of waiting time because of delay to lie between C= 16 per hour (for leisure
travellers) and C= 39 per hour (for business travellers) within the EU. See Boon et al 2008,
p. 29-30.
112 Art. 6 (1)(ii), Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council
amending Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and
assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay
of flights and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage
of passengers and their baggage by air, COM (2013) 130 final, 13.3.2013.
113 An article in the Dutch newspaper “de Volkskrant” (13 March 2013) quotes the chairman
of the EP’s Commission on Transport and Tourism, who showed doubts whether the EP
would agree with the proposal. See http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/
detail/3408661/2013/03/13/Rech-ten-passagier-bij-vertraging-verbeterd-en-verslech-
terd.dhtml (last visited 28 February 2014).
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be governed by the applicable national private law, within the remits of the
Montreal Convention.’
As under Regulation 889/2002 on air carrier liability in the event of accidents,
the following provision could be included:
‘The liability of a Community air carrier in respect of passengers (...) shall be
governed by all provisions of the Montreal Convention relevant to such liabil-
ity.’114
Furthermore, Article 12 (1) of the current Regulation could be improved:
‘This Regulation shall apply without prejudice to a passenger’s rights to further
compensation under the Montreal Convention. The passenger may cumulate the available
remedies under this Regulation and under theMontreal Convention. However, the passenger
may not be compensated for the same damage twice. Therefore, the compensation granted
under this Regulation may be deducted from such compensation.’
Recognition of the concurrence between both instruments in such a way would
also clarify an inconsistency between the text of the current provision and the
line of reasoning by the ECJ. Two sites may be recognised in literature: some
authors argue that Article 12 (1) would make many claims for additional
damages meaningless, because the fixed compensation (C= 250-600) must be
deducted from that claim,115 while others argue that the amounts may be
received cumulatively, because the ECJ perceives the damages as being of an
entirely different nature.116 By recognising the overlap of both instruments,
debates of this kind are nipped in the bud. The passenger may then choose
to sue either on the basis of the Convention or the Regulation, or both.117
If he already got compensation under the Regulation, he would be able to bring
a successful claim under the Convention only for additional damage.
Furthermore, recognising the concurrence between both regimes may enable
the EU legal order to benefit from existing efforts to harmonise private law
114 Regulation (EC) No 889/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 May
2002 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in the event
of accidents, OJ L 140, 30/05/2002 p. 2 – 5, Art. 3 (1). See e.g. ECJ 6 May 2010, C-63/09,
ECR 2010, p. I-04239 (Axel Walz/Clickair), in which the ECJ interprets Art. 22 (1) of the
Montreal Convention.
115 See De Vos 2012, p. 173-174.
116 See Radoševic´ 2012, p. 106.
117 Then there is no need to strictly separate the two instruments when it comes to damages.
See e.g. ECJ 13 October 2011, C-83/10, ECR 2011, p. I-09469 (Rodríguez/Air France), where
the Court ruled that Art. 12 Regulation ‘may not be the legal basis for the national court
to order an air carrier to reimburse to passengers whose flight has been delayed or cancelled
the expenses the latter have had to incur because of the failure of that carrier to fulfil its
obligations to assist and provide care under Article 8 and Article 9 of Regulation No 261/
2004’.
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on the international level. Then there is no need for the ECJ to rule that – in
the absence of EU rules on this matter – actions for compensation under the
Regulation are subject to national statutory prescription periods.118 Instead
of maintaining needless diversity between national laws on this point, these
actions would then be subject to the limitation period of two years under the
Convention.119
Some may oppose such a coordinated approach, because it would mean
that the ECJ has to take foreign case law into account when applying the
Regulation. As a result, airlines will grasp every possibility to invite the ECJ
to reconsider its interpretation. In my opinion, this argument should not be
overdone. The Court may still very well play its own role, also when it engages
in autonomous interpretation of the Convention. As the debate on the scope
of the Montreal Convention shows, to plead for strict uniform application is
illusory.120
In my opinion, it is more likely that airlines and courts will cooperate with
the ECJ if the inconsistencies with the Convention are reduced, defendants are
allowed to invoke their rights under the Convention and a proper level of
convergence is reached through clear judgments by the ECJ. The Court may
even lead by example in interpreting the provisions of the Convention. Finally,
if airlines fail to comply with their basic obligations under the Regulation,
nothing, not even the Convention,121 stands in the way of punitive sanctions
by State authorities within the realms of administrative law.122
3.8 CONCLUSION
Current air law is a showcase of multilevel regulation. The rights and obliga-
tions of airlines and their passengers are governed both by the Montreal
Convention and by EU Regulation 261/2004. As we have seen, the EU placed
118 As the ECJ did in ECJ 22 November 2012, C-139/11, nyr (Moré/KLM).
119 Art. 35 of the Montreal Convention.
120 See section 3.1. See e.g. Smits 2013, p. 6-7, on the difficulties of uniform interpretation of
international sales law (CISG). See also Lord Wilberforce in HL 14 February 1980, [1980]
1All ER 556 (Photo Production/Securicor Transport), at 562: ‘To plead for complete uniformity
may be to cry for the moon.’
121 Since the Convention only governs actions for damages between private parties to the
carriage contract.
122 The Regulation already responds to this need, by designating national enforcement bodies
(NEB), responsible for the monitoring of compliance with the Regulation. In the Netherlands,
the responsible enforcement body is the Inspectie Leefomgeving en Transport. The proposal
also provides for stronger coordination and exchange of information between the NEBs,
see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending
Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance
to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights
and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in respect of the carriage of
passengers and their baggage by air, COM (2013) 130 final, 13.3.2013, p. 8.
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itself in a difficult position by adopting Regulation 261/2004 shortly after it
had signed the Montreal Convention. Both instruments provide for different
standards for liability. While the Convention allows the airlines to avoid
liability for certain expenses during delay, the Regulation does not. Although
the ECJ affirmed the direct effect of the Montreal Convention within the EU
legal order, and although consistent interpretation seemed possible, the Court
decided to uphold the Regulation. It argued that both instruments are of a
different nature, covering different heads of damage. It even expanded the
Regulation by awarding delayed passengers standardised compensation, which
goes beyond the actual damage suffered and therefore conflicts with the
Convention.
Theoretically, it would have been possible to reach the same results by
using the blueprint. After all, the Court could still have decided that both
instruments do not overlap and that application of the blueprint is not needed.
On the other hand, it is established practice that the legal relationship between
the parties should be governed not entirely by formal categories of the law
(contract/tort, Regulation/Convention), but by recognising their overlap and
interaction. It is this spirit of coordination which lacks in the judgments of
the ECJ, but which does come forward in a recent proposal by the European
Commission, which suggests several adjustments to sober down the Regulation.
To conclude, this chapter has shown a prime example of a normative
conflict between different legal orders. As we have seen, this conflict has not
been solved satisfactorily by the ECJ. I would argue that, by using the
traditional blueprint, such an outcome would have been less likely. The coher-
ence and legitimisation of legislation and case law would be improved if such
standards of interpretation would be used, both by the Court and the EU
legislator.
4 Concluding remarks
In this contribution, I have argued that the general concept of concurrence
is still relevant to understand new developments on the borderlines of inter-
national, European and Dutch private law.
Something old. As we have seen, these developments may not be that
different from what we are used to. The Common European Sales Law which
– upon the agreement of the parties – will govern their legal relationship,
provides for a good example. Because claimants may invoke national private
law as well, this optional instrument leads to ‘classic’ problems of concurrence:
different prescription periods and different standards for liability. I have
argued that such issues of concurrence are not truly exceptional, but comfortab-
ly fit within existing categories of the law. Therefore, their solution may very
be coordinated by using the existing blueprint. There is no risk of undermining
the CESL because for the bigger part, the blueprint tends to ensure that the
application of tort law is not frustrating the purpose of a contract law norm.
Its application would only rarely lead to a real escape into the law of torts, when
the stakes are high and the basis for exclusive application of the CESL weak.
Something new. Some areas of private law belong solely to the field of
international and European law. In this contribution, one prime example has
been examined: the rights and obligations of airlines and their passengers
under a carriage contract. The experiences with Regulation 261/2004 show
that the ECJ sometimes prefers exclusive application of EU law, even if that
seems inconsistent with other applicable instruments. I have argued that by
using the traditional blueprint, such an outcome would have been less likely,
while it would enable the EU legal order to benefit from existing efforts to
harmonise private law. Although the recent proposal by the European Com-
mission removes some tension, and shows that the ECJ has been unduly strict,
confusion will remain as long as the two instruments are not aligned more
closely.
Something borrowed, something blue? In the near future, the EU will continue
to develop and adopt legislation governing the relationship between private
parties, either directly or indirectly. As a result, their legal disputes will be
regulated by different patchworks of applicable rules and remedies, grounded
in different legal orders. The blueprint may prove to be a helpful method to
understand and scrutinise these developments. It may clarify case law and
legislation, and serve as inspiration for possible solutions. A commitment to
the principles underlying the blueprint is necessary to make sure that, also on
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the European level, the legal relationship between the parties is not governed
entirely by formal categories of the law, and the rights of the claimant and
defendant are not entirely dependent on whether the claimant frames his action
in one branch of the law, or the other. As such, the blueprint provides for a
critical, but constructive eye to follow the process of harmonisation of private
law, so as to make sure that existing rights, obligations and defences are not
passed by.
Finally, these developments make clear that the blueprint has not become
insignificant. Applying it to new problems of concurrence does not make it
‘endless’, as Bakels argued. Indeed, after its application extended beyond the
contract-tort divide, it is now beginning to cross the borders of national law.
But so has private law itself, under the increasing influence of European and
international law. This should encourage us to look for pragmatic solutions.
To my mind, the blueprint is such a solution. It could lead to more coherence
and better coordination, and its application should therefore be subject of
further research. Well-tried legal techniques pose a valuable answer to the
challenges in the current multilevel legal order.
Bibliography
Alexy 2009
R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009.
Asser/Hartkamp 3-I* 2011
A.S. Hartkamp, Mr. C. Asser’s handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burger-
lijk recht. 3. Vermogensrecht algemeen. Deel I. Europees recht en Nederlands vermogens-
recht, Deventer: Kluwer 2011.
Atiyah 1979
P. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, Oxford: OUP 1979.
Bakels 1996
F.B. Bakels, ‘Vloeiend verbintenissenrecht’, RM Themis 1996, p. 42-56.
Bakels 2009
F.B. Bakels, ‘Aspecten van samenloop (I)’, WPNR 2009/6796, p. 337-346.
Balfour 2010
J. Balfour, ‘Airline Liability for Delays: The Court of Justice of the EU Rewrites
EC Regulation 261/2004’, Air and Space Law 2010/1.
Balfour 2012
J. Balfour, ‘EU Regulation 261 and Compensation for Delay: The Advocate
General’s Opinion in the References re Sturgeon’,Air & Space Law 2012/4-5, p. 377-
392.
Barents 2009
R. Barents, ‘De voorrang van unierecht in het perspectief van constitutioneel
pluralisme’, SEW 2009/2.
Von Bar 1996
C. von Bar, Gemeineuropäisches Deliktsrecht, München: C.H. Beck 1996.
Von Bar & Drobnig 2004
C. von Bar & U. Drobnig, The Interaction of Contract Law and Tort and Property Law
in Europe. A Comparative Study, München: Sellier European Law Publishers 2004.
Bernitz et al. 2013
U. Bernitz, X. Groussot & F. Schulyok (eds.), General Principles of EU Law and
European Private Law, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2013.
De Búrca 2010
G. de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order
After Kadi’, Harvard International Law Journal 2010/1, p. 1-49.
52 Bibliography
Von Bogdandy 2008
A. von Bogdandy, ‘Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relation-
ship between international and domestic constitutional law’, International Journal
of Constitutional Law 2008/6, p. 397-413.
Van Boom & Van Doorn 2006
W.H. van Boom & C.J.M. van Doorn, ‘Productaansprakelijkheid en productveilig-
heid’, in: E.H. Hondius & G.J. Rijken (eds.), Handboek consumentenrecht, Zutphen:
Paris Uitgevers 2006, p. 261-280.
Boon et al. 2008
M. Bak, B.H. Boon, C. Doll, H.P. van Essen, M. Maibach, B. Pawlowska, C.
Schreyer, A. Schroten, R. Smokers, D. Sutter, Handbook on estimation of external costs
in the transport sector. Internalisation Measures and Policies for All external Cost of
Transport (IMPACT), Delft: CE 2008. To be consulted via: http://ec.europa.eu/
transport/themes/sustainable/doc/2008_costs_handbook.pdf (last visited: 15 June
2013).
Boukema 1966
C.A. Boukema, Civielrechtelijke samenloop, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1966.
Boukema 1992
C.A. Boukema, Samenloop, Deventer: Kluwer 1992.
Bregstein 1960
M.H. Bregstein, ‘De samenloop van vorderingen bij gebrekkige levering uit koop’,
in: M.H. Bregstein, Verzameld werk vanM.H. Bregstein, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink
1960, p. 407-426.
Brieskorn 2010
K. Brieskorn, Vertragshaftung und responsabilité contractuelle, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck
2010.
Brunner 1984
C.J.H. Brunner, Beginselen van samenloop, Arnhem: Gouda Quint 1984.
Calabresi 1982
G. Calabresi, ACommon Law for the Age of Statutes, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press 1982.
Cane 1997
P. Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Cartwright 2013
J. Cartwright, Contract Law. An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the
Civil Lawyer, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2013.
Castermans & De Graaff 2013
A.G. Castermans & R. de Graaff, ‘Samenloop in een meerlagige rechtsorde. Verval
en verjaring in het Europees contractenrecht’, in: C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd et al.
(eds.),Rechtsvinding in eenmeerlagige rechtsorde (BWKJ 28), Deventer: Kluwer 2013,
p. 43-65.
Castermans & Krans 2009
A.G. Castermans & H.B. Krans, ‘Samenloop en de toegang tot de rechter’, in: A.G.
Castermans et. al. (eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009.
Castermans 2012a
A.G. Castermans, Ik en mijn recht in Europa, Leiden: Leiden University Press 2012.
Bibliography 53
Castermans 2012b
A.G. Castermans, ‘Partijautonomie tussen contract en onrechtmatige daad’, Ars
Aequi 2012, p. 859-868.
Collins 2013
H. Collins, ‘Why Europe Needs a Civil Code’, European Review of Private Law 2013/
4, p. 907-922.
Craig & De Búrca 2011
P. Craig & G. de Búrca, EU law. Text, Cases and Materials (5th edition), Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2011.
Cuyvers 2011
A. Cuyvers, ‘The Kadi II judgment of the General Court: the ECJ’s predicament
and the consequences for Member States’, European Constitutional Law Review
2011/7, p. 481-510.
Van Dam 2010
C.C. van Dam, ‘Luchtvaartmaatschappijen zijn niet gek op passagiersrechten’, NJB
2010, p. 547 et seq.
Van Dam 2011
C.C. van Dam, ‘Air Passenger Rights after Sturgeon’, Air and Space Law 2011/4-5,
p. 259-274.
Dannemann & Vogenauer 2013
G. Dannemann & S. Vogenauer, The Common European Sales Law in Context: Inter-
actions with English and German Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013.
Deakin et al. 2013
S. Deakin, Angus Johnston & B. Markesinis, Markesinis and Deakin’s Tort Law.
Seventh Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2013.
Drion 1954
H. Drion, Limitation of liabilities in international air law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
1954.
Dworkin 1986
R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Cambridge: Belknap University Press 1986.
Eeckhout 2011
P. Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011.
Eidenmüller et al. 2012
H. Eidenmüller, N. Jansen, E-M. Kieninger, G. Wagner & R. Zimmermann, ‘The
Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law: Deficits of the Most
Recent Textual Layer of European Contract Law’, The Edinburgh LawReview 2012/3.
Fedtke 2014
J. Fedtke, ‘The Changing Nature of U.S. (Common?) Tort Law’, in: P. Mankowski
& W. Wurmnest (eds.), Festschrift für Ulrich Magnus, München: Sellier European
Law Publishers 2014, p. 3-20.
Garben 2013
S. Garben, ‘Sky-high controversy and high-flying claims? The Sturgeon case law
in light of judicial activism, euroscepticism and eurolegalism’, CommonMarket Law
Review 2013/1, p. 15-46.
54 Bibliography
Gerards 2006
J.H. Gerards, ‘Belangenafweging bij rechterlijke toetsing aan fundamentele rechten’,
Deventer: Kluwer 2006.
Van Gerven & Covemaecker 2006
W. van Gerven & S. Covemaecker, Verbintenissenrecht, Leuven: Acco 2006.
Van Gerven & Lierman 2010
W. van Gerven & S. Lierman, Beginselen van Belgisch privaatrecht (I). Algemeen Deel.
Veertig jaar later, Mechelen: Kluwer 2010.
Gilmore 1974
G. Gilmore, The Death of Contract, Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1974.
Goedhuis 1937
D. Goedhuis,National air legislations and theWarsawConvention, The Hague: Marti-
nus Nijhoff 1937.
Van Goudoever 1917
H. van Goudoever, Over samenloop en strijd van eigen wetten in het burgerlijk recht,
Groningen: Noordhoff 1917.
Haak 2010
K.F. Haak, ‘De rol van het Europees Hof van Justitie in het passagiersvervoer door
de lucht’, Tijdschrift voor Privaatrecht 2010/2, p. 493-520.
Haentjens & Den Hollander 2013
M. Haentjens & P.W. den Hollander, ‘Europees aansprakelijkheidsrecht door de
voordeur: de aangescherpte verordening inzake ratingbureaus’, WPNR 2013/6985,
p. 623-624.
Hartkamp 2011
Hartkamp, ‘Samenloop in het Europese privaatrecht’, in De Boer et al. (Eds.),
Strikwerda’s Conclusies, Deventer: Kluwe 2011, p. 153-169.
Hartkamp, Sieburgh & Keus 2007
A.S. Hartkamp, C.H. Sieburgh & L.A.D. Keus (ed.), De invloed van het Europese
recht op het Nederlandse privaatrecht, Deel I. AlgemeenDeel (‘Onderneming en Recht’,
part 42-I), Deventer: Kluwer 2007.
Hesselink 1994
M.W. Hesselink, ‘De opmars van de goede trouw in het Franse contractenrecht’,
WPNR 1994/6154, p. 694-968.
Hesselink 1999
M.W. Hesselink, De redelijkheid en billijkheid in het Europese privaatrecht, Deventer:
Kluwer 1999.
Hondius 2011
E.H. Hondius, ‘Towards a European Civil Code’, in: A.S. Hartkamp et al. (eds.),
Towards a European Civil Code, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International
2011.
Horner & Legrez 1975
R.C. Horner & D. Legrez, Second International Conference on Private International
Aeronautical LawMinutes,Warsaw 1929, South Hackensack: Fred B. Rothman 1975.
Howarth 2011
D. Howarth, ‘The General Conditions of Unlawfulness’, in: A.S. Hartkamp et al.
(eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law Inter-
national 2011, p. 845-887.
Bibliography 55
Janssen 2007
J.F.M. Janssen, ‘Wanneer is sprake van samenloop?’, in: I.S.J. Houben et al. (eds.),
Samenloop, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 18-23.
Koch 1995
D. Koch, Produkthaftung: zur Konkurrenz von Kaufrecht und Deliktsrecht, Berlin:
Duncker und Humblot 1995.
Koning 2007
I. Koning, Aansprakelijkheid in het luchtvervoer. Goederenvervoer onder de verdragen
van Warschau en Montreal, Zutphen: Paris 2007.
Koning 2013a
I. Koning, ‘Final boarding call voor de luchtvaartmaatschappijen’, NJB 2013,
p. 532-541.
Koning 2013b
I. Koning, ‘Recente ontwikkelingen in het Europese luchtvervoer’, Tijdschrift voor
Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 2013/3, p. 113-120.
Van Koppen 1998
F.P. van Koppen, Actio Pauliana en onrechtmatige daadvordering, Deventer: Kluwer
1998.
Krans 1999
H.B. Krans, Schadevergoeding bij wanprestatie, Deventer: Kluwer 1999.
The Law Commission 2001
The Law Commission, Report ‘Limitation of Actions’, 9 July 2001 (Law Com No.
270).
The Law Commission & Scottish Law Commission 2011
The Law Commission [of England and Wales] and The Scottish Law Commission,
An Optional Common European Sales Law: Advantages and Problems. Advice to the UK
Government, 10 November 2011, to be consulted via: http://www.scotlawcom.gov.
uk/index.php/download_file/view/931/468/.
Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons 2010
K. Lenaerts & J.A. Gutiérrez-Fons, ‘The constitutional allocation of powers and
general principles of EU law’, Common Market Law Review 2010, p. 1629–1669.
Licˇková 2008
M. Licˇková, ‘European Exceptionalism in International Law’, The European Journal
of International Law 2008/3, p. 463-490.
Low & Muir 2013
G. Low & E. Muir, ‘The Privatization of European law and Constitutionalization
of Private Law: Two Sides of the Same Coin (Editorial)’, European Review of Private
Law 2013/5-6, 1159-1164.
Maitland 1909
F.W. Maitland, ‘Lecture I: The forms of action at Common Law’, in: F.W. Maitland,
Equity also, The forms of action at Common Law; two courses of lectures, Cambridge
University Press 1909, p. 1-9.
Mak 2012
C. Mak, ‘Europe-building through private law. Lessons from constitutional theory’,
European Review of Contract Law 2012/3, p. 326-341.
56 Bibliography
Mayer & Lindemann 2014
H-P. Mayer & J. Lindemann, ‘Zu den aktuellen Entwicklungen um das Gemein-
same Europäische Kaufrecht auf EU-Ebene’, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht
2014/1, p. 1-6.
McDonald 2010
M. McDonald, ‘The Montreal Convention and the Preemption of Air Passenger
harm Claims’, The Irish Jurist 2010/XLIV, p. 203-238.
Meijer 2012
P. Meijer, ‘Passagiersrechten in het luchtvervoer: erop of eronder’, Tijdschrift voor
Consumentenrecht en handelspraktijken 2012/4, p. 142-150.
Meijer & Lindenbergh 2008
J.W.M.K. Meijer & S.D. Lindenbergh, ‘Asbestschade buiten werkomgeving’, NJB
2008, p. 379 et seq.
Meijers 1947
E.M.M. Meijers,De algemene begrippen van het burgerlijk recht, Leiden: Universitaire
Pers Leiden 1947.
Mendes de Leon 2010
P. Mendes de Leon, ‘De vulkaan in IJsland en de Sturgeon-zaak uit Luxemburg
leiden tot uitbarstingen’, NJB 2010, p. 1218-1225.
Mendes de Leon 2012
P. Mendes de Leon, ‘De Sturgeon-uitspraak van het Europese Hof van Justitie
inzake passagiersrechten in het luchtvervoer. Quod est corrigendum’, Ars Aequi
2012/5.
Mok 2006
M.R. Mok, case note under ECJ 10 January 2006, C-344/04, ECR 2006, p. I-00403
(IATA and ELFAA), published in NJ 2006/372.
Mok 2010
M.R. Mok, ‘Het arrest Sturgeon: een reactie’, NJB 2010, p. 1234.
Nieuwenhuis 1976
J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Legitimatie en heuristiek van het rechterlijk oordeel’, RM Themis
1976, p. 494 et seq.
Nieuwenhuis 1982
J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Anders en eender, Deventer: Kluwer 1982.
Nieuwenhuis 1998
J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘De actio Pauliana begrepen als vordering uit onrechtmatige
daad’, in: L. Timmerman (Ed.), Vragen rond de faillissementspauliana (Insolad Jaar-
boek 1998), Deventer: Kluwer 1998, p. 51-64.
Nieuwenhuis 2006
J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Waartoe is het recht op aarde?, Den Haag: Boom Juridische
Uitgevers 2006.
Nieuwenhuis 2007
J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘They still rule us from their graves’, WPNR 2009/6693, p. 1-6.
Nieuwenhuis 2008
J.H. Nieuwenhuis,Onrechtmatige daden. Délits, Unerlaubte Handlungen, Torts, Deven-
ter: Kluwer 2008.
Nieuwenhuis 2010
J.H. Nieuwenhuis, ‘Eenzame hoogte: het DES-arrest’,Ars Aequi 2010/6, p. 417-419.
Bibliography 57
O’Donovan 2005
J. O’Donovan, Lender Liability, London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd 2005.
Pargendler 2012
M.S. Pargendler, ‘The Rise and Decline of Legal Families’, American Journal of
Comparative Law 2012/4, p. 1043-1074.
Phippard 1997
S. Phippard, ‘Exclusivity of the Warsaw Convention’, The Aviation Quarterly 1997,
p. 394 et seq.
Radoševic´ 2013
S. Radoševic´, ‘CJEU’s Decision in Nelson and Others in Light of the Exclusivity of
the Montreal Convention’, Air & Space Law 2013/2, p. 95-110.
Scheltema & Scheltema 2013
M. Scheltema & M.W. Scheltema, ‘Gemeenschappelijk Recht. Wisselwerking tussen
privaat- en publiekrecht’, Deventer: Kluwer 2013.
Scholten 1974
P. Scholten, Algemeen deel, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1974.
Schoordijk 1979
H.C.F. Schoordijk,Het algemeen gedeelte van het verbintenissenrecht, Deventer: Kluwer
1979.
Schulze 2012
R. Schulze (Ed.), Common European Sales Law (CESL). Commentary, Nomos Verlags-
gesellschaft: Baden-Baden 2012.
Sieburgh 2009
C.H. Sieburgh, ‘Ich weiâ nicht was soll es bedeuten’, in A.G. Castermans et al.
(eds.), Ex libris Hans Nieuwenhuis, Deventer: Kluwer 2009, p. 239-267.
Smeehuijzen 2008
J.L. Smeehuijzen, De bevrijdende verjaring, Kluwer: Deventer 2008.
Smith 2011
C.E. Smith, ‘Meergelaagdheid van rechtsordes: oude wijn in nieuwe zakken?’,Ars
Aequi 2-11, p. 753-757.
Smits 2002
J.M. Smits, The Making of European Private Law. Toward a Ius Commune Europaeum
as a Mixed Legal System, Antwerpen / Oxford / New York: Intersentia 2002.
Smits 2013
J.M. Smits, ‘Problems of Uniform Sales Law – Why the CISG may not promote
international trade’, Maastricht European Private Law Institute Working Paper, No.
2013-1, to be accessed via www.ssrn.com.
Snijders 1973
W. Snijders, ‘Samenloop van wetsbepalingen in het nieuwe BW’, in: J.F. Glastra
van Loon (ed.), Speculum Langemeijer, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1973.
Snijders 2009
H.J. Snijders, ‘Verjaring van aan de schuldeiser onbekende rechtsvorderingen’,
NTBR 2009/48.
Snijders 2012
W. Snijders, ‘Twintig jaar nieuw BW’, Ars Aequi 2012/11, p. 946-954.
58 Bibliography
Star Busmann 1925
C.W. Star Busmann, Hoofdstukken van burgerlijke rechtsvordering, Haarlem: Erven
F. Bohn 1925.
Suijling 1934
J.P. Suijling, Inleiding tot het burgerlijk recht. Vol. II. Deel 1, Haarlem: Erven F. Bohn
1934.
Thomas et al. 2012
J. Thomas e.a. (red.), Statement of the European Law Institute on the Proposal for a
Regulation on the Common European Sales Law, ELI: Vienna 2012. See www.european
lawinstitute.eu/projects/publications/.
Tompkins 2010
G.N. Tompkins Jr., Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation as
Developed by the Courts in the United States, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law
International 2010.
Tridimas 2007
T. Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press
2007.
Twigg-Flesner 2011
C. Twigg-Flesner, ‘“Good-Bye Harmonisation by Directives, Hello Cross-Border
only Regulation?” – A way forward for EU Consumer Contract Law’, European
Review of Contract Law 2011/2, p. 235-256.
Veldhoen 2013
F. Veldhoen, ‘Samenloop in het Europese privaatrecht’, WPNR 2013/6975, p. 267-
374.
Vloemans & Van den Heuvel 2013
N. Vloemans & A. van den Heuvel, ‘Kroniek aansprakelijkheid voor niet-loon-
dienstgerelateerde asbestschade’, AVS 2013/12, p. 96-110.
Vogenauer 2012
S. Vogenauer, ‘The Drafting of the CESL: An Assessment and Suggestions for
Improvement’, 15 October 2012, available at www.europarl.europa.eu/studies.
De Vos 2012
G.J.H. de Vos, ‘Nelson, TUI en de wet van Sturgeon’, Tijdschrift Vervoer & Recht
2012/6, p. 172-174.
Vranken 1995
J.B.M. Vranken, C. Asser’s Handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk
recht. Algemeen deel*, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1995.
Walker 2008
N. Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global
Disorder of Normative Orders’, Int. J. Constitutional Law 2008, p. 397.
Ward 2010
P. Ward, Tort Law in Ireland, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2010.
Wegter 2006
J.J. Wegter, ‘The ECJ Decision of 10 January 2006 on the Validity of Regulation
261/2004: Ignoring the Exclusivity of the Montreal Convention’, Air & Space Law
2006/2.
Bibliography 59
Wessel & Wouters 2007
R.A. Wessel & J. Wouters, ‘The Phenomenon of Multilevel Regulation: Interactions
between Global, EU and National Regulatory Spheres’, in: Follesdal et al. (eds.),
Multilevel Regulation and the EU, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill 2008.
Wiersma 1960
K. Wiersma, ‘Behoort de wet algemene regelen te bevatten omtrent de verhouding
tussen de vordering uit onrechtmatige daad en die uit overeenkomst, en zo ja,
welke?’, in: Hand. NJV 1960 I, Zwolle: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1960, p. 229-238.
Wilhelmsson 2004
T. Wilhelmsson, ‘The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for
EC Consumer Law”, Journal of Consumer Policy 2004/27, p. 317-337.
Wyatt 2009
D. Wyatt, ‘Community Competence to Regulate the Internal Market’, in M. Dougan
& S. Currie (eds.), 50 Years of the European Treaties: looking back and thinking forward,
Oxford: Hart Publishing 2009.
Zerres 2009
T. Zerres, Bürgerliches Recht. Eine Einführung in das Zivilrecht und die Gründzuge
des Zivilprozessrechts, Heidelberg: Springer 2009.
Zimmermann 1996
R. Zimmermann, The law of obligations: Roman foundations of the civilian tradition,
Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996.
Zimmermann 2011
R. Zimmermann, ‘Roman Law and the Harmonization of Private Law in Europe’,
in: A.S. Hartkamp et al. 2011 (eds.), Towards a European Civil Code, Nijmegen: Ars
Aequi Libri 2011.
Uniken Venema/Zwalve 2000
W.J. Zwalve, C.Æ. Uniken Venema’s Common Law and Civil Law. Inleiding tot het
Anglo-Amerikaanse vermogensrecht, Deventer: W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 2000.

Case law
Reference is made to the relevant sections in this contribution.
European Court of Human Rights
· ECtHR 22 October 1996, ECHR Reports 1996-IV, p. 1487, par. 50 (Stubbings v. United
Kingdom) | 2.3
· ECtHR 11 March 2014, Application nos. 52067/10 and 41072/11 (Howald Moor
and Others/Switzerland) | 2.3
European Court of Justice / Court of Justice of the European Union
· ECJ 30 April 1974, 181/73, ECR 1974, p. 449 (Haegeman/Belgium) | 3.4
· ECJ 6 October 1982, 283/81, ECR 1982, p. 3415 (CILFIT) | 3.3
· ECJ 22 October 1987, 314/85, ECR 1987, p. 4199 (Foto-Frost) | 3.3
· ECJ 30 September 1987, 12/86, ECR 1987, p. 3719 (Demirel) | 3.4
· ECJ 21 February 1991, C-143/88 and C-92/89, ECR 1991, p. I-415 (Zuckerfabrik
Süderdithmarschen and Zuckerfabrik Soest) | 3.3
· ECJ 15 December 1995, C-415/93, ECR 1995, p. I-4921 (UEFA/Bosman) | 1.4
· ECJ 10 September 1996, C–61/94, ECR 1996, p. I-3989 (Commission/Germany) | 3.4
· ECJ 19 November 1998, C-162/97, ECR 1998, p. I-7477 (Nilsson and Others) | 3.5
· ECJ 23 November 1999, C-149/96, ECR 1999, p. I-8395 (Portugal/Council) | 3.4
· ECJ 22 April 1999, C-423/97, ECR 1999, p. I-2195 (Travel Vac SL/Sanchis) | 1.4
· ECJ 5 October 2000, C-376/98, ECR 2000, p. I-8419 (Germany/European Parliament
and Council) | 2.1
· ECJ 12 July 2005, C-154/04 and C-155/04, ECR 2005, p. I-06451 (Alliance for Natural
Health and Others) | 3.5
· ECJ 24 November 2005, C-136/04, ECR 2005, p. I-10095 (Deutsches Milch-Kontor)
| 3.5
· ECJ 13 July 2006, C-295/04 and C-298/04, ECR 1995, p. I-6619 (Manfredi) | 2.3
· ECJ 10 January 2006, C-344/04, ECR 2006, p. I-00403 (IATA and ELFAA) | 3.3-3.4,
3.5, 3.6
· ECJ 19 November 2009, C-402/07 and C-432/07, ECR 2009, p. I-10923 (Sturgeon/
Condor and Böck/Air France) | 3.6-3.7
· ECJ 6 May 2010, C-63/09, ECR 2010, p. I-04239 (Axel Walz/Clickair) | 3.7
· ECJ 13 October 2011, C-83/10, ECR 2011, p. I-09469 (Rodríguez/Air France) | 3.7
· ECJ 23 October 2012, C-581/10 and C-629/10, nyr (Nelson/Lufthansa and TUI Travel/
Civil Aviation Authority) | 3.6
· ECJ 22 November 2012, C-139/11, nyr (Moré/KLM) | 3.7
· ECJ 31 January 2013, C-12/11, nyr (McDonagh/Ryanair) | 3.3
62 Case law
Belgian Supreme Court / Hof van Cassatie
· Cass. 4 June 1973, RW 1971-1972/371 (EBES) | 1.1
· Cass. 7 December 1973, RW 1973-1974/1597 (Stuwadoors) | 1.1
· Cass. 1e civ. 29 September 2006, RW 2006-2007/1718 | 1.1
· Cass. 3e civ. 27 November 2006, RABG 2007, p. 1247-1257 | 1.1
Dutch Supreme Court / Hoge Raad der Nederlanden
· HR 9 December 1955, NJ 1956/157 (Bogaard/Vesta) | 1.1
· HR 6 March 1959, NJ 1959/349 (Revenir/Bertha) | 1.1
· HR 29 April 1983, NJ 1983/627 (Spruijt/Sperry Rand Holland) | 3.3
· HR 1 July 1983, NJ 1984/149 (Herzfeld/Groen) | 3.3
· HR 20 January 1989, NJ 1989/322 (Wesselingh/Weisz) | 3.3
· HR 6 April 1990, NJ 1991/689 (Van Gend & Loos/Vitesse) | 1.1
· HR 29 juni 1990, NJ 1991/306 (Schils/Ubachs) | 3.3
· HR 9 October 1992, NJ 1994/535 (‘DES daughters’) | 2.2-2.3
· HR 27 October 1995, NJ 1996/254 (Den Haan/The Box Fashion) | 3.3
· HR 3 November 1995, NJ 1998/380 (Van B./Vereniging voor Diaconessenarbeid) | 2.2
· HR 2 October 1998, NJ 1999/682 (Koninklijke Schelde/Wijkhuisen) | 1.2
· HR 28 April 2000, NJ 2000/430 (Erven Van Hese/Koninklijke Schelde) | 2.2-2.3
· HR 20 October 2000, NJ 2001/268 (Soolsma/Hertel) | 2.2
· HR 31 October 2003, NJ 2006/112 (Saelman) | 2.2
· HR 26 November 2004, NJ 2006/228 (De Jong/Optimodal) | 2.2
· HR 25 november 2005, NJ 2009/103 (Erven Horsting/Eternit) | 2.2
· HR 21 April 2006, NJ 2006/272 (Inno Holding/Gemeente Sluis) | 1.2, 2.3
· HR 2 March 2007, NJ 2007/240 (Holding Nuts-bedrijf Westland) | 1.2
· HR 15 June 2007, NJ 2007/621 (Fernhout/Essent) | 1.2-1.3
· HR 29 June 2007, NJ 2008/606 (Pouw/Visser) | 1.2
· HR 23 November 2007, NJ 2008/552 (Ploum/Smeets) | 2.3
· HR 21 March 2008, NJ 2008/297 (NSI/Uoti) | 3.3
· HR 2 December 2011, NJ 2012/197 (Nefalit/Schraa) | 1.2
Dutch Courts of Appeal / Gerechtshoven
· Court of Appeal ’s-Hertogenbosch 25 March 2008, NJ 2009/104 | 2.2
· Court of Appeal ’s-Gravenhage 3 April 2012, JA 2012/118 | 2.2
Supreme Court of Canada
· SCC 9 October 1986, [1986] 31 DLR (4th) 481 (Central Trust Company/Rafuse) | 1.1
French Supreme Court / Cour de Cassation
· Cass. 11 January 1922, DP 1922.I.16 | 1.1
· Cass. 2e civ. 26 May 1992, Bull. Civ. 1992.II.154 | 1.1
· Cass. 15 June 1999, n° 97-100268 | 3.1
· Cass. 1e civ. 19 March 2002, CCC 2002/106, n° 00-13971 | 1.1
Bibliography 63
German Federal Court of Justice / Bundesgerichtshof
· BGH 24 November 1976, BGHZ 67, p. 362 et seq. | 1.1
Irish Supreme Court
· IESC, IR 1979/249 (Finlay/Murtagh) | 1.1
House of Lords
· HL 14 February 1980, [1980] 1 All ER 556 (Photo Production/Securicor Transport)
| 3.7
· HL 3 July 1985, AC 1985/80 at 107 (Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd/Liu Chong Hing Bank)
| 1.1
· HL 25 July 1994, [1995] 2 AC 145, at 184 (Henderson/Merrett Syndicates Ltd) | 1.1-1.2
· HL 12 December 1996, [1997] AC 430, at 444 (Abnett/British Airways and Sidhu/
British Airways) | 3.1
· HL 8 December 2005, [2005] 2 CLC 1083 (Deep Vein Thrombosis/Air Travel Group
Litigation) | 3.1

Index
Reference is made to the relevant sections in this contribution.
A
actio | 1.3
asbestos | 2.2
B
B2B | 2.2
B2C | 2.2
blueprint
· application | 1.3, 2.3-2.4, 3.4-3.7
· criteria | 1.3
· criticism | 1.3
C
cancellation | 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7
civilian tradition | 1.3
coordination
· between contract and tort | 1.2
· between different layers of law
| 1.4
· between Montreal Convention
and Regulation 261/2004 | 3.4-
3.7
common law | 1.1, 1.3, 3.1
compensation
· deduction | 3.4
· different types of compensation
| 3.5
· for loss, injury or damage | 2.1
· under the Montreal Convention
| 3.1
· under Regulation 261/2004 | 3.2
· standardised compensation
| 3.6-3.7
Common European Sales Law (CESL)
· CESL v. tort law | 2.3
· objectives, scope | 2.1
· prescription periods | 2.2-2.3
concurrence
· see free concurrence; non-cumul
des résponsabilités
consistent interpretation | 3.4, 3.5
constitutional principles | 1.4
constitutionalist v. pluralist approach
| 1.4
contract law v. tort law
· aims | 1.1
· dividing line | 1.2
· primary level v. secondary level
| 1.3
consequential losses | 2.1, 2.3
consumer protection
· consumer rights | 2.1
· consumer sales | 2.1
· misleading advertising | 2.1
· unfair commercial practices | 2.1
· unfair contract terms | 2.1
D
damages
· damages v. ‘inconvenience’
| 3.5-3.6
· for breach of contract v. damages
for tort | 1.1
· for consequential losses | 2.3
· for loss because caused by non-
performance | 2.2
· material and non-material (psy-
chological) | 2.2, 3.1
· under the Montreal Convention
| 3.1
delay | 3.2-3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7
defences | 2.3, 3.1, 3.5-3.6
denied boarding | 3.2, 3.6-3.7
66 Index
DES daughters | 2.2-2.3
direct effect | 3.4
Draft Common Frame of Reference
(DCFR) | 1.4
duty to complain | 2.2
E
EU legal order | 3.4-3.5, 3.7
effet-utile | 2.3
equal treatment | 3.6
equity | 1.3
Eyjafjallajökull | 3.3
exclusivity
· as an exception | 1.3
· of the CESL | 2.3
· of the Montreal Convention
| 3.1, 3.4
· under DCFR | 1.4
extraordinary circumstances | 3.1-3.2,
3.3, 3.4-3.7
F
forms of action | 1.3
fraud | 2.2-2.3
free concurrence
· between contract and tort | 1.1-
1.3
· in international air law | 3.4
· limitations | 1.2-1.3
· under CESL | 2.3
· under DCFR | 1.4
H
harmonisation
· air law | 3.2, 3.4
· consumer law | 2.1
· maximum harmonisation | 2.1
· minimum harmonisation | 2.1
· tort law | 2.3
heuristics v. legitimisation | 1.3
hierarchy | 1.4
I
insurance coverage | 2.2
international agreement | 3.2, 3.4
interpretation
· contra legem | 3.7
· method of interpretation | 1.3-
1.4
· substance v. maxims | 1.3-1.4
L
law of obligations | 1.3
lex specialis derogat legi generali | 1.3
liability
· causal link | 2.2, 3.5-3.7
· directors | 1.3
· employees | 1.3
· establishment | 1.1-1.2
· exclusion | 1.2
· joint and several | 2.2
· limitation | 1.2
· market share | 2.2
· product liability | 2.2
· strict liability v. liability based
on fault | 1.1, 3.3, 3.5
M
mesothelioma | 2.2
mistake | 2.2-2.3
Montreal Convention
· objectives, scope | 3.1
· travaux préparatoires | 3.1
N
nonconformity | 1.2, 2.2-2.3
non-cumul des résponsabilités | 1.1-
1.4, 2.3
normative conflict | 1.3-1.4, 3.8
O
optional instrument | 2.1
P
passenger rights
· care and assistance | 3.3, 3.5-3.7
· compensation, see above
· reimbursement | 3.2-3.3
passing-on claims | 3.6
parliamentary history | 2.3
party autonomy | 1.3
prescription periods | 1.1-1.2, 2.2-2.3,
3.7
private international law | 2.1
proportionality | 2.3
Index 67
R
ratio decidendi | 1.1, 3.1
Regulation 261/2004
· objectives, scope | 3.2
rule of law | 1.3
S
statutory limitations
· see prescription periods
subsidiarity | 1.4, 2.3
T
termination | 2.2
U
uniform application | 2.1, 2.3, 3.1-3.2,
3.7
W
Warsaw Convention | 3.1

In the range of books published by the Meijers Research Institute and Graduate School of
Leiden Law School, Leiden University, the following titles were published in 2013 and 2014
MI-214 C.M. Smyth, The Common European Asylum System and the Rights of the Child: An
Exploration of Meaning and Compliance, (diss. Leiden), Leiden 2013
MI-215 A.F. Mollema,Het beperkte recht. Een analyse van zijn theoretische constructie, zijn plaats
in het systeem van het vermogensrecht en zijn mogelijke inhoud, (diss. Leiden), Leiden:
Uitgeverij BOXPress 2013, ISBN 978 90 8891 597 0
MI-216 V.S. Bouman, De baai geblokkeerd: piraten in het nauw? Een onderzoek naar de toelaat-
baarheid en het effect van het blokkeren van The Pirate Bay, (Jongbloed scriptieprijs
2012), Den Haag: Jongbloed 2013, ISBN 978 90 7006 268 2
MI-217 C.G. Breedveld-de Voogd, A.G. Castermans, M.W. Knigge, T. van der Linden, J.H.
Nieuwenhuis & H.A. ten Oever (red.), Rechtsvinding in een meerlagige rechtsorde.
BWKJ nr. 28, Deventer: Kluwer 2013, ISBN 978 90 1311 482 9
MI-218 J.M. ten Voorde, C.P.M. Cleiren & P.M. Schuyt, Meerdaadse samenloop in het strafrecht.
Een onderzoek naar doel, grondslag, karakter, strekking en functie van de wettelijke regeling
van meerdaadse samenloop (artikel 57-63 Sr), Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgevers
2013, ISBN 978 90 8974 843 0
MI-219 J. Nijland, De overheidsonderneming. Overheidsinvloed in kapitaalvennootschappen nader
beschouwd, (diss. Leiden), Leiden: Uitgeverij BOXPress 2013, ISBN 978 90 8891 719 6
MI-220 K.M.P. Setiawan, Promoting Human Rights. National Human Rights Commissions in
Indonesia and Malaysia, (diss. Leiden), Leiden: Leiden University Press 2013, ISBN
978 90 8728 203 5, e-isbn 978 94 0060 166 6 (pdf), e-isbn 978 94 0060 167 3 (ePub)
MI-221 J. Uzman,Constitutionele remedies bij schending van grondrechten.Over effectieve rechts-
bescherming, rechterlijk abstineren en de dialoog tussen rechter en wetgever, (diss. Leiden),
Deventer: Kluwer 2013, ISBN 978 90 1312 059 2
MI-222 D.A. Dam-de Jong, International law and governance of natural resources in conflict
and post-conflict situations, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2013, ISBN 978 94
6203 475 4
MI-223 W. Geelhoed, Het opportuniteitsbeginsel en het recht van de Europese Unie. Een onderzoek
naar de betekenis van strafvorderlijke beleidsvrijheid in de geëuropeaniseerde rechtsorde,
(diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2013, ISBN 978 90 1312 132 2
MI-224 A.F. Rommelse, De arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering: tussen publiek en privaat. Een
beschrijving, analyse en waardering van de belangrijkste wijzigingen in het Nederlandse
arbeidsongeschiktheidsstelsel tussen 1980 en 2010, (diss. Leiden), Leiden: Leiden
University Press 2014, ISBN 978 90 8728 205 9, e-ISBN 978 94 0060 170 3
MI-225 L. Di Bella, De toepassing van de vereisten van causaliteit, relativiteit en toerekening bij
de onrechtmatige overheidsdaad, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2014, ISBN 978 90
1312, e-ISBN 978 90 1312 041 7 040 0
MI-226 H. Duffy, The War on Terror' and International Law, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen:
Wöhrmann 2013, ISBN 978 94 6203 493 8
MI-227 A. Cuyvers, The EU as a Confederal Union of Sovereign Member Peoples. Exploring
the potential of American (con)federalism and popular sovereignty for a constitutional theory
of the EU, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann 2013, ISBN 978-94-6203-500-3.
MI-228 M.J. Dubelaar, Betrouwbaar getuigenbewijs. Totstandkoming en waardering van strafrech-
telijke getuigenverklaringen in perspectief, (diss. Leiden), Deventer: Kluwer 2014, ISBN
978 90 1312 232 9
MI-229 C. Chamberlain, Children and the International Criminal Court. Analysis of the Rome
Statute through a Children’s Rights Perspective, (diss. Leiden), Zutphen: Wöhrmann
2014, ISBN 978 94 6203 519 5
MI-230 R. de Graaff, Something old, something new, something borrowed, something blue?,
Applying the general concept of concurrence on European sales law and international air
law, (Jongbloed scriptieprijs 2013), Den Haag: Jongbloed 2014, ISBN 978 90 7006
271 2
For the complete list of titles (in Dutch), see: www.law.leidenuniv.nl/onderzoek/publiceren

